

8 The Deprivatization of Modern Religion

The pre-text and point of departure of this study was the empirical proposition that we are witnessing the *deprivatization* of religion in the modern world. The impulse behind the study was the realization that the dominant sociological theories of religion in the modern world and the dominant liberal or civic republican models of analysis of the private/public distinction were of little help when trying to come to terms theoretically, analytically, and practically with this new, or at least newly appreciated, fact. Thus, there was a need to rethink systematically the relationship of religion and modernity, and the possible roles religions may play in the public sphere of modern societies. This study has been an attempt in this direction.

What are the conditions of possibility for modern public religions? This is the fundamental question that was addressed systematically in the first theoretical part through a critical reconstruction of the paradigm of secularization and through an analysis of various modes of conceptualizing the private/public distinction and their possible articulation with the religious sphere. A series of related general theoretical-analytical propositions are developed that are subsequently substantiated in the case studies.

The paradigm of secularization has been the main theoretical and analytical framework through which the social sciences have viewed the relationship of religion and modernity. A central thesis and main theoretical premise of this work has been that what usually passes for a single theory of secularization is actually made up of three very different, uneven and unintegrated propositions: secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere. If the premise is correct, it should follow from the analytical distinction that the fruitless secularization debate can end only when sociologists of religion begin to examine and test the validity of each of the three propositions independently of each other.

It is simply fallacious to argue, for instance, that the permanence or increase in religious beliefs and practices, and the continuous emergence of new religions and the revival of old ones in the United States or anywhere else, serves as empirical confirmation that the theory of secularization is a myth. It only confirms the need to refine the theory by distinguishing between the general historical structural trend of secular differentiation and the different ways in which different religions in different places respond to and are affected by the modern structural trend of differentiation. Similarly, it is incorrect to claim that the role religion has recently played in political conflicts throughout the world serves to invalidate empirically the theory of secularization. But no less incongruous is the position of those defenders of the theory of secularization who use the thesis of privatization to accuse religion of trespassing illegitimately on the public sphere or of crossing systemic boundaries by assuming nonreligious roles.¹

Properly speaking, this work is not a comprehensive or systematic study of the theory of secularization nor is there any attempt to test or validate conclusively each of the three different propositions of the paradigm. The study's main aim was to develop an appropriate theoretical-analytical framework for the comparative historical study of public religions in the modern world. Nonetheless, the study offers some general claims or hypotheses about each of the three subtheses of the theory of secularization that later find at least partial substantiation in the comparative historical studies.

Concerning the first thesis, that of secularization as differentiation, it is a central claim of this study that this remains the valid core of the theory of secularization. The differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms remains a general modern structural trend. Indeed, this differentiation serves precisely as one of the primary distinguishing characteristics of modern structures. Each of the two major modern societal systems, the state and the economy, as well as other major cultural and institutional spheres of society—science, education, law, art—develops its own institutional autonomy, as well as its intrinsic functional dynamics. Religion itself is constrained not only to accept the modern principle of structural differentiation of the secular spheres but also to follow the same dynamic and to develop an autonomous differentiated sphere of its own.

This study is also not the place to explicate, illustrate, or substantiate this process of differentiation in each of the spheres. It has only attempted to analyze some aspects of the process of differentiation of the religious and the political sphere, first theoretically in the first part, by exploring the dynamics of differentiation of the religious and political

communities, and then in the case studies by analyzing different patterns of separation of church and state. It is a central claim of this study, again first elaborated theoretically and later substantiated in the comparative historical studies, that established churches are incompatible with modern differentiated states and that the fusion of the religious and political community is incompatible with the modern principle of citizenship.

This claim, however, is not new. It is as old as the Enlightenment critique of religion in all its variants (American, French, or German), and it became a central tenet of modern liberalism. It was also central to the theological writings of the young Hegel and to the criticism of religion of the Young Hegelians.² Through them it entered into Weber's church-sect typology. When a religion becomes disestablished, when it loses its compulsory institutional character, it becomes a voluntary religious association, either a sect or a "free church." Once freedom of religion is established, moreover, from the perspective of the now secular state all religions, churches, and sects turn into denominations. This process—and this is another of the central claims of this study—is also a modern structural trend that has the same kind of "providential" force which Tocqueville attributed to democratization, or, one could add, which Marx attributed to proletarianization and Weber to bureaucratization. These are all modern, in the long run irresistible, structural trends.³

It stands to reason that churches may prefer to resist this trend, sects may prefer to withdraw into separate fundamentalist isolation, and states may still find it useful to master established religions for the sake of integration of their political communities. In my view, the study offers adequate empirical evidence in support of the claim that the long, protracted, and, in some places like Spain, tragically disastrous resistance of the Catholic church to the modern structural trend of differentiation of church and state, and of the religious and political communities, has come to an end. The Catholic church's declaration of religious freedom at Vatican II and the subsequent acceptance of the constitutional separation of church and state in newly established democratic regimes throughout the Catholic world offer indirect and direct confirmation of the "providential" character of this modern structural trend, at least for the time being and for the area under study here, that is, Western Christendom and its colonial outposts.

But the decline of religious beliefs and practices is manifestly not a modern structural trend, although it is very clearly a dominant historical trend in many modern Western, particularly European, societies. It is this second connotation of the modern process of secularization that is most questionable as a theoretical and as a general empirical proposition,

and that has led many sociologists of religion to question uncritically and unjustifiably the entire theory of secularization. Although the present study does not attempt to validate or elaborate them systematically, it presents a series of general propositions it claims can offer a better explanation of the differential rates of secularization between, say, Western Europe and America, or Spain and Poland, than traditional sociological explanations in terms of the correlation between decreasing rates of religious beliefs and practices and increasing rates of industrialization, urbanization, education, and the like.

Some of the related propositions presented in the study are that the thesis of religious decline has its origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion; that this critique was not so much a theoretical statement or an empirical proposition as a practical political program; that this practical political program was most effective wherever churches had attained caesareopapist establishment and were resisting the process of differentiation and emancipation of the cognitive-scientific, political-practical, or aesthetic-expressive secular spheres from religious and ecclesiastical tutelage; that in such cases the Enlightenment critique of religion was usually adopted by social movements and political parties, becoming in the process a self-fulfilling prophecy; that once in power those movements and parties tended to translate the theory into applied state policies, in extreme cases enforcing and administering through violent coercion the process of secularization from above.

In very simple terms it could be said that the more religions resist the process of modern differentiation, that is, secularization in the first sense, the more they will tend in the long run to suffer religious decline, that is, secularization in the second sense. Since strictly speaking this is a study of public religions, it says very little about the types and nature of modern private religions, about the character and modes of self-reproduction of the modern differentiated religious sphere. But tentatively one could offer the related proposition that those religions, by contrast, which early on accept and embrace the modern principle of differentiation will also tend to accept the modern denominational principle of voluntarism and will be in a better position both to survive the modern process of differentiation and to adopt some form of evangelical revivalism as a successful method of religious self-reproduction in a free religious market. This, at least, seems to be the effective lesson of American religious "exceptionalism."

The lesson of Polish exceptionalism, by contrast—Poland being like the United States a highly industrialized, urbanized, and educated society with uncommonly high rates of religious practice and belief—seems to be that it is not resistance to modern differentiation *per se* which weakens

religious institutions but, rather, resistance from a position of political or social establishment. When the resistance comes from a disestablished hierocratic institution opposing a process of differentiation that is being carried out by a state power which lacks societal legitimacy, then the resistance to secularization may be associated with societal resistance to illegitimate state power and such a resistance may actually strengthen hierocratic religious institutions.⁴

Finally, with respect to the third subthesis of the secularization paradigm, it is the major purpose and thrust of this study to show both theoretically and empirically that privatization is not a modern structural trend. In other words, this study has tried to show that there can be and that there are public religions in the modern world which do not need to endanger either modern individual freedoms or modern differentiated structures. It is true that, like religious decline, privatization is also a dominant historical trend in many societies, usually in the same ones which experience religious decline, both processes being interrelated. But privatization is not a modern structural trend but, rather, a historical option. To be sure, it seems to be a modern "preferred option," but it is an option nonetheless.

Privatization is preferred internally from within religion as a result of modern processes of religious rationalization. This preference is evinced by general pietistic trends, by processes of religious individuation, and by the reflexive nature of modern religion. Privatization is determined externally by structural trends of differentiation which tend to constrain religion into a differentiated, circumscribed, marginalized, and largely "invisible" religious sphere. But equally important, privatization is mandated ideologically by liberal categories of thought which permeate not only political ideologies and constitutional theories but the entire structure of modern Western thought.

For that reason, sociological theories and liberal political analysis have found it difficult to conceptualize properly and to comprehend that new phenomenon which I call the deprivatization of modern religion. The explanations one usually finds of the public character of many religions in the modern world are of two kinds. There are, on the one hand, utilitarian secularist explanations which reduce the phenomenon either to an instrumental mobilization of available religious resources for non-religious purposes or to an instrumental adaptation of religious institutions to the new secular environment. There are, on the other hand, secular-humanist explanations which tend to interpret religious mobilization either as fundamentalist antimodern reactions of hierocratic institutions unwilling to give up their privileges or as the reactionary mobilization of traditionalist groups resisting modernization. Undoubtedly,

many contemporary forms of religious mobilization may have such a character, but the deprivatization of modern religion cannot be reduced to any of those significations. Indeed, such explanations prefer to ignore the intrinsically religious character of the phenomenon and the normative challenge it presents to residual rationalist, secularist understandings of modernity. As will be shown shortly, a third type of explanation, the "return of the sacred," though more adequate in trying to come to terms with the specific and permanent nature of religion as a social phenomenon, also fails to capture the particularly historical, noncyclical character of the new phenomenon.

The partly theoretical, partly typological discussion of private and public religions in chapter 2 has been an attempt to develop a new analytical framework with which to tackle the historical dynamics of privatization and deprivatization of religion from a new perspective. The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, from the perspective of a broad historical sociology of religion it examines the built-in tensions between private and public religions by counterposing the Durkheimian functionalist perspective of social integration and the Weberian phenomenological perspective of salvational meaning at three different levels of analysis—the interactive, the organizational, and the societal levels. The analysis tries to show that religion cannot be reduced to any of the two poles. Religion always transcends any privatistic, autistic reality, serving to integrate the individual into an intersubjective, public, and communal "world." Simultaneously, however, religion always transcends any particular community cult, serving to free the individual from any particular "world" and to integrate that same individual into a transsocial, cosmic reality. Goffman's private/public distinction serves to illustrate the same tension, now from the perspective of modern religion, between the "invisible" religion of the self and associational denominationalism.

Next, the liberal and the civic-republican private/public distinctions are counterposed to one another in order to show how each of them alone is unable to categorize the new phenomenon of deprivatization of religion: the liberal perspective because it insists on the need to confine religion to a private sphere, fearing that public religions must necessarily threaten individual freedoms and secular differentiated structures; the civic-republican perspective because, while correctly stressing the relevance of public religions for intersubjective normative structures ("the common good"), for civic virtue, and political participation, like the liberal perspective, it also conceives of public or civil religions in premodern terms as coextensive with the political or societal community.

The next step is the introduction of a Habermasian discursive model of the public sphere and of recent theories of civil society which have incorporated reflexively the experience of recent transitions to democ-

racy in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and which operate with a tripartite analytical division of the polity into state, political society, and civil society.⁵ This move allows both the construction of a typology of public religions based on this tripartite division and the conceptualization of a modern form of public religion characterized by the public intervention of religion in the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society. The result is a conception of modern public religion which is compatible with liberal freedoms and with modern structural and cultural differentiation.

Finally, the analysis incorporates Seyla Benhabib's synthesis of a radical proceduralist discursive model of the public sphere with a feminist critique of the privatization of gender and the feminine sphere.⁶ Such a move allows us to view the deprivatization of religion in analogical terms as an agonistic resistance to attempts to confine religion and morality to a private sphere ("home") and as a normative critique of the amoral public sphere of "work"—economic and state institutions. As in the case of feminism, this dual normative critique leads to a dual challenge of established boundaries. The deprivatization of religion has a double significance here in that it simultaneously introduces publicity, that is, intersubjective norms into the private sphere (analogous to the feminist dictum "the personal is political"), and morality into the public sphere of state and economy (the principle of the "common good" as a normative criterion).

Before indicating how this analytical framework for the study of public religions is used in the case studies, a few methodological comments are in order. As already mentioned, the case studies tell five different stories of the transformation of public religions on the roads to modernity. It is true that the comparative studies use the analytical framework developed in the first theoretical part, serve to illustrate the typology of public religions developed in chapter 2, and, in my view, serve to substantiate the main theoretical propositions concerning secularization and deprivatization. Nevertheless, this is not the sole or primary purpose of the comparative studies. On the one hand, the theoretical-analytical framework, since it examines the general conditions of possibility for modern public religions, is broader and more general than each and all the particular case studies. These particular case studies cannot and are not meant to prove any general theory. On the other hand, however, each of the case studies transcends the theoretical-analytical framework. In other words, the stories were not framed for theoretical-analytical purposes. I have tried to respect as much as possible the complexity and diversity of the different historical realities, avoiding the temptation to impose any homogenizing interpretive scheme upon them.⁷

I do not view history or social reality as a source of data for theory

building, as a field laboratory for theory testing, or as a means to the advancement of scientific sociology. I view sociology, rather, as a source of theoretical concepts and analytical tools for the comparative historical interpretation of social reality and for the collective self-understanding of the present. The aim of sociology is to understand ourselves—that is, the historical actors and the practical contexts of individual and collective action—better. Consequently, the case studies were not constructed in such a way that they would best confirm any theory or illustrate any typology. They were meant to illuminate different contexts of action for actors and observers alike. The ability to throw new light upon a known reality I consider the ultimate test of the relevance of this or any sociological study. Typologies can be constructed from various points of view. This study has constructed a particular typology of public religions using the tripartite division of the modern democratic polity into state, political society, and civil society. Since to each of these levels there corresponds a different form of public sphere, there can be in principle public religions at the state level, public religions active in political society, and public religions which participate in the public sphere of civil society. As already indicated, the purpose of this particular typology is to facilitate the analysis of those forms of public religion which are compatible with modern individual freedoms and with modern differentiated structures. Other purposes would have required the construction of other typologies and the choice of other case studies.

Some of the varieties of public religion illuminated by this typology and illustrated by the case studies are as follows:

a) At the state level: established state churches, of which the Spanish Catholic church may serve as the paradigmatic example, and national churches in search of a state, of which the Polish church may serve as an equally illustrative paradigm.

b) At the political society level: on the one hand, one may consider the whole range of religious movements resisting disestablishment and the differentiation of the secular spheres (e.g., the mobilization of Spanish Catholicism against the liberal revolution and against the First and Second Spanish Republics; and the Protestant crusades to Christianize the American Constitution or common law) or the mobilizations and countermobilizations of religious groups and confessional parties against other religions or against secularist movements and parties (e.g., Catholic Action in Spain, Poland, and Brazil in the 1930s; the Catholic Electoral League (LEC) in Brazil or the Confederation of Autonomous Parties of the Right (CEDA) during the Second Spanish Republic; Christian Democratic parties; American Protestant nativist parties and movements; the electoral mobilization of Catholic immigrants; and the elec-

toral mobilization of Protestant fundamentalism against "secular humanism"); on the other hand, one could mention religious groups mobilized in defense of religious freedom (Catholic mobilization in Communist Poland); religious institutions demanding the rule of law and the legal protection of human and civil rights, or protecting the mobilization of civil society and defending the institutionalization of democratic regimes (Catholic churches in Spain, Poland, and Brazil).

c) At the civil society level: one may distinguish between hegemonic civil religions (e.g., Evangelical Protestantism in nineteenth-century America) and the public intervention of religious groups, either agonically (e.g., the anti-abortion movement) or discursively (e.g., the Catholic bishops' Pastoral Letters) in the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society.

It has been maintained throughout this study that ultimately only public religions at the level of civil society are consistent with modern universalistic principles and with modern differentiated structures. Strictly speaking, established state religions are "public" only in one of three senses: (a) in the premodern medieval sense of "representative publicness," the public representational role of the Polish Primate as *Interrex* or the role of the British monarch as head of the caesaropapist Church of England being cases in point; (b) in the early modern etatist sense of being an administrative appendage of the absolutist caesaropapist state and thus partaking of the "public authority" of state institutions—here one could distinguish confessional states proper such as authoritarian Catholic regimes and the established churches of nonconfessional democratic states such as the Scandinavian Lutheran churches; and (c) in the sense of mobilizational religions taking over the modern state and its legal framework and shaping it in a theocratic-totalitarian direction, the fusion of clerical Catholic and fascist elements in the early mobilizational phase of the Franco regime being a stunted prototype, the Shiite hierocratic revolutionary regime in Iran being a more fully developed type.⁸

The first two forms of "publicness," the "publicness of representation" and the "publicness of administrative state authority," do not constitute a modern public sphere in the modern sense of a discursive or agonistic space in principle open to all citizens and all issues.⁹ The mentioned examples of the caesaropapist British monarch and the established Scandinavian churches are rather residual anachronisms which are compatible with the separate institution of a modern democratic public sphere. Mobilizational state religions, by contrast, are forms of deprivatization of modern religion which create a totalitarian participatory publicness that tends to destroy the very boundaries between the private and

public spheres by infringing upon private rights (freedom of conscience being the most sacred of private rights) and destroying public liberties (freedom of speech being the constitutive principle of a modern public sphere).

Practically all the examples of mobilized public religion at the political society level mentioned above are transitional types. In the first group belong all types of public religion mobilized either to resist secularization or to counteract secularist movements and parties. This study contends that the age of secular-religious cleavages, of struggles over the historical process of modern secularization, has basically come to an end in the historical area of Western Christendom. As the Catholic church has finally accepted the legitimacy of the modern structural trend of secularization, that is, has accepted voluntarily disestablishment, and a mutual rapprochement between religious and secular humanism has taken place, the *raison d'être* of this type of mobilized political religion tends to disappear. As churches transfer the defense of their particularistic privilege (*libertas ecclesiae*) to the human person and accept the principle of religious freedom as a universal human right, they are for the first time in a position to enter the public sphere anew, this time to defend the institutionalization of modern universal rights, the creation of a modern public sphere, and the establishment of democratic regimes. This is what I call the transformation of the church from a state-oriented to a society-oriented institution. Churches cease being or aspiring to be state compulsory institutions and become free religious institutions of civil society. Insofar as the churches and their secular allies are successful in their struggles against authoritarian states, this type of mobilized political religion also loses its *raison d'être*—unless the churches resist full secularization and a new cycle of religious-secular cleavages, and mobilizations and countermobilizations begins. Of the case studies analyzed in this book, today such a scenario seems plausible, although unlikely, only in Poland.

The last cases of religion "going public" or taking a public stand for the sake of defending the very right to a modern public sphere already constitute examples of what I term the deprivatization of modern religion. As used throughout this study, the term deprivatization has three different connotations, one polemical, the other two descriptive. The term is used first of all polemically against those versions of the theory of secularization and those liberal political theories that prescribe the privatization of religion as a modern structural trend necessary to safeguard modern liberties and differentiated structures. This study has shown that such an indiscriminate position against all forms of public religion is unfounded, that there are some forms of deprivatization of

religion which may be justifiable and even desirable from a modern normative perspective.

I admit to a certain uneasiness in coining and using such a unrefined neologism as deprivatization. But the barbarism may be justified as long as the term maintains its polemical value, that is, as long as it is not widely recognized that religions in the modern world are free to enter or not to enter the public sphere, to maintain more privatistic or more communal and public identities. Privatization and deprivatization are, therefore, historical options for religions in the modern world. Some religions will be induced by tradition, principle, and historical circumstances to remain basically private religions of individual salvation. Certain cultural traditions, religious doctrinal principles, and historical circumstances, by contrast, will induce other religions to enter, at least occasionally, the public sphere.

Besides its polemical connotation, however, the term has been used in this study to describe two different kinds of move or relocation of religion. The active role of the Catholic church in processes of democratization in Spain, Poland, and Brazil marks the passage from a nonmodern *estatist* (Spain), *representational* (Poland), or *corporatist* (Brazil) form of publicity to the modern public sphere of civil society. In these cases the descriptive connotation is somewhat misleading since we are not dealing so much with a move from the private to the public sphere as with a change in the type of publicity. The descriptive connotation of the term deprivatization is properly speaking only appropriate for cases such as the public mobilization of Protestant fundamentalism or the public interventions of the American Catholic bishops, both of which represent a move by religion from the private to the public sphere.

Nonetheless, despite the possible misunderstandings that may result from using the same term somewhat inaccurately for such different connotations, I think that it is appropriate and valid to maintain the term in order to call attention to the fact that these three diverse connotations of the term deprivatization may also be viewed as interrelated aspects of the historically new phenomenon analyzed in this study. Namely, it is my contention that the rejection by certain religious traditions of the privatized role to which they were being relegated by secularist modernization theories and by liberal political theories, that the role of the Catholic church in processes of democratization, and that the public interventions of religion in the public sphere of modern civil societies can no longer be viewed simply as antimodern religious critiques of modernity. They represent, rather, new types of immanent normative critiques of specific forms of institutionalization of modernity which presuppose precisely the acceptance of the validity of the fundamental values

and principles of modernity, that is, individual freedoms and differentiated structures. In other words, they are immanent critiques of particular forms of modernity from a modern religious point of view.

As already mentioned, deprivatization in the sense of relocation of religion from a premodern form of publicness to the public sphere of civil society is a transitional phase which is conditioned by the very success of the move. Paradoxically, once the move has succeeded with the consolidation of a democratic regime, there is built-in pressure toward the privatization of religion. As the analysis of the Brazilian transition has indicated, this pressure toward the privatization of religion comes from four different sources:

a) There is a general trend toward the demobilization and privatization of civil society once "the hour of civil society" and its mobilized resistance against the authoritarian state passes and political society and its forms of representation and mediation by professional political elites become institutionalized.

b) Also noticeable are new Vatican directives and efforts to tame and control the public interventions of national Catholic churches and "progressive" Catholic groups, to restrain and regain control of the process of *aggiornamento* from above, and to remind pastoral agents of their primarily "pastoral" professional tasks and duties. Naturally, this is a particularly Roman Catholic conjunctural pressure, associated with the so-called project of "restoration" of Pope John Paul II and Cardinal Ratzinger. Undoubtedly, the internal hegemonic struggles between the Catholic left and the Catholic right are relevant in understanding this pressure.¹⁰ But it is shortsighted to view the Vatican directives solely in this ideological light. They are better understood if viewed from the perspective of what John A. Coleman has called the institutional dynamics of *raison d'église*, that is, by the "organizational imperatives and predicaments" confronting a universal church which has finally accepted the structure of the modern world.¹¹ Surely, given the transnational, hierarchic, bureaucratic, and centralized character of the Catholic church, the Vatican attempt to regain administrative and doctrinal centralized control can easily be understood. But the Catholic church has to face two additional organizational imperatives which are connected with modern structural conditions and which also press toward privatization.

c) Under conditions of modern religious freedom the Catholic church is likely to face competition either from other religions or from secular worldviews. In order to face this competition successfully the Catholic church, while still counting on a large reservoir of traditional cultural allegiance among large sectors of the faithful, will have to learn from

the American experience, concentrate on its pastoral tasks, and develop some form of voluntary, denominational, revivalist expression to reproduce itself successfully as a private religion of individual salvation. The Spanish example shows that in some places it may be too late to learn the American lesson, as Spanish Catholicism has joined general Western European secularizing trends, that is, has undergone a sharp decline of religious beliefs and practices.

d) Given modern structural conditions, if the Catholic church wants to maintain its universalist claims as a church, it will have to learn to live with social and cultural pluralism both outside and specially inside the church. This means that to maintain its viability as a private religion it will have to cater to the various pastoral needs of increasingly diverse Catholic groups, while to maintain its effectiveness as a public religion its public interventions will have to be and appear nonpartisan and non-denominational; that is, they will have to be framed in a universalistic language. This by no means precludes a "preferential option for the poor" or a continuation of the traditional Catholic opposition to abortion. On the contrary, it is the moral obligation to protect human life and to demand universal access to discourse, justice, and welfare that requires that the Universal Church take such a position or such an option. But most important, whichever position or option it takes, the church will have to justify it through open, public, rational discourse in the public sphere of civil society. Moreover, as the lesson of American Catholicism indicates, the church will have to learn to let all the faithful participate in the constant elaboration and reformulation of its normative teachings and allow for different practical judgments as to how to interpret those normative teachings in concrete circumstances.

As already indicated, privatization and deprivatization are historical options for modern religions. It has not been the intention of this study to counter the general, teleological theory of privatization with a general, teleological theory of deprivatization. To claim that we are witnessing a historical process of deprivatization of modern religion does not mean to imply that this is a new, general, historical trend. Indeed, it would be foolish to attempt to predict how general and how permanent this historical trend will turn out to be. The inclusion of the study of Spanish Catholicism, not intended originally, was meant to check any teleological impulse from author or reader to conceive deprivatization as a general historical reversal of processes of secularization. The Spanish lesson seems to be that, in some places, traditional theories of secularization in its triple connotation of structural differentiation, religious decline, and privatization of religion are still empirically valid. The advantage of the comparative historical analytical framework for the study of seculariza-

tion developed here derives precisely from the fact that it is dynamic and flexible enough to be able to account for very different patterns of secularization and to be open to the varieties of ways in which different religions in different settings respond to modern structural trends of differentiation.

The claim that deprivatization is a historical option precludes the possibility of predicting the way in which any particular religion is going to respond. But on the basis of some evidence from the case studies and on some general theoretical assumptions, one could at least infer some of the conditioning factors that may be conducive to the intervention of religion in the modern public sphere.

The first condition is almost tautological. Only those religions which either by doctrine or by cultural tradition have a public, communal identity will want to assume public roles and resist the pressure to become solely or even primarily private "invisible" religions of individual salvation. Particularly, those religions which, after abandoning their identities as compulsory institutions, maintain their identities as churches—in the dual Durkheimian-Hegelian sense of ethical community and in the Weberian sense of having universalist salvational claims—will tend more likely than not also to claim the right and duty to assume public roles. This tendency will be the more pronounced the more such religions have a historical tradition of assuming prominent public roles.

The Spanish case shows, however, that neither doctrine nor historical tradition are *per se* sufficient for a religion to be able to maintain an effective public presence in modern civil societies, unless it is also able to maintain a dynamic and vital profile as a private religion of salvation. It is unlikely that a religion weakened by the process of secularization, which has suffered serious decline, will be able to withstand the pressures of privatization. This is the reason why cyclical theories of the return of the sacred or cyclical theories of religious revivals are ultimately flawed.

The two best-known variants, Daniel Bell's prediction of the return of the sacred and Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge's general theory of secularization, revival, and cult formation, despite significant differences are both predicated on the assumption that functional need—in Bell's case the universal and permanent anthropological need for meaning, in Stark and Bainbridge's case the need for supernatural compensation—is the mother of religious invention.¹² If the assumption were correct, the sacred should have returned and religious revivals or the birth of new religions should have occurred there, where secularization had gone the furthest and the absence of religion created the greatest need. Accordingly, we should have witnessed religious revivals in highly secularized societies such as Sweden, England, France, Uruguay, and Russia.

Yet the public resurgence of religion took place in places such as Poland, the United States, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Iran, all places which can hardly be characterized as secularized wastelands. What we witnessed in the 1980s was not the birth of new religions or the return of the sacred where religious traditions had dried up but, rather, the revitalization and reformation of old living traditions and the assumption of public roles by precisely those religious traditions which both theories of secularization and cyclical theories of religious revival had assumed were becoming ever more privatized and irrelevant in the modern world.

There is a third conditioning factor which both facilitates and induces religions to assume public roles, namely, the contemporary global context of action. Under conditions of globalization religions will tend to assume public roles whenever their identity as universal transnational religions is reinforced by their actual situation as transnational religious regimes. In the case of Catholicism, the interrelated dynamics of globalization and public involvement of the various national churches in their particular societies has been obvious since the 1960s. Vatican II, the first truly global council, made the Roman church aware of its global reach and induced it to think globally. Simultaneously, however, the inner-worldly turn of the Vatican *aggiornamento* led each national church to greater secular involvement in its particular society and to translate the universal Catholic message both literally and figuratively into the vernacular.

Two interrelated, only apparently contradictory, processes became noticeable throughout the Catholic world. There was, on the one hand, a strengthening of the process of centralization of the Roman Papacy, a long secular process which in its modern form has its origins in the Vatican's defensive response to the French Revolution and to the subsequent liberal revolutions spreading throughout Europe and Latin America. Vatican II produced not only administrative and doctrinal centralization but also the homogenization and globalization of Catholic culture, at least among the elites, throughout the Catholic world. On the other hand, Vatican II and the subsequent institutionalization of national bishops' conferences also reinforced a parallel process of decentralization and "nationalization" of Catholic churches, that is, of centralization at the national level, which in most places was begun by Catholic Action.

It was this combination of globalization, nationalization, secular involvement, and voluntary disestablishment that led to the change of orientation from state to society and permitted the church to play a key role in processes of democratization. The national churches stopped viewing themselves as integrative community cults of the national state and adopted a new transnational, global identity which permitted them

to confront prophetically both the national state and the given social order. The study of American Catholicism indicated a similar transformation of identity from an affirmative, integrative American civil religion to a new type of critical, globally oriented public Catholicism. It is the new tension between a global orientation to human civil society and public involvement in the public sphere of a particular civil society that best explains the new dynamics of deprivatization.

Even in the case of Protestant fundamentalism one can observe a similar dynamic combination of globalization, nationalization, and secular involvement. Fundamentalist global thinking had a dual source in the global reach of evangelical missionary efforts and in premillennial apocalyptic visions of Armageddon, both of which awakened a keen interest among fundamentalists in American foreign policy and world politics, now viewed from the biblical perspective of the history of salvation. Underneath their sectarian rejection of modern America, fundamentalists had kept latent their intense Americanism and their faith in America's millennial destiny. Thus, once it came, the call to national revival, to turn America around and to become involved in a new Christian crusade, was eagerly heard. The direction taken by deprivatization in this particular case was a return from sectarian exile back to reestablishment as the hegemonic American civil religion.

Roland Robertson has argued convincingly that ongoing processes of globalization in the dual sense of the emergence of global humankind and the emergence of a global system of societies entail the relativization of the personal identity of the self in reference to humankind as a whole, the relativization of membership in any particular national society by reference to global humanity, and the relativization of particular national societies from the perspective of the world system of societies.¹³

Not surprisingly, global and transnational religions are well situated when it comes to responding to the challenges or taking advantage of the opportunities presented by processes of globalization. Perhaps the most significant new global development of the last twenty years has been the crisis of absolutist principles of state sovereignty and *raison d'état* and the emergence of global dynamics of democratization. Among some of the related developments are the collapse of the system of socialist states, the global defeat of national security doctrines, the crisis of the established principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of nation-states, and the crisis of state-led models of economic development and societal modernization. New dynamics of civil society formation both intrasocietally and globally have played no small part in those developments, while churches and religious movements have played a crucial role both in the revitalization of particular civil societies and in

the emergence of a global civil society. It is not surprising that the crisis of territorial state sovereignty and the expansion of a global civil society offer special opportunities to a transnational religious regime like the Catholic church which had always found it difficult to reconcile its identity as a catholic-universal church with the reality of the modern system of territorial sovereign states.¹⁴ Paradoxically, the old gods and the old religions, which according to Durkheim were on their deathbed, have been revitalized by becoming the carriers of the process of sacralization of humanity that Durkheim himself had announced.¹⁵

Only in a very broad sense is it appropriate to attribute the return of the old gods to the crisis of their old enemies, Enlightenment rationalism and secular modernity. It is at this level of analysis, however, namely, in terms of a crisis of Enlightenment rationalism and of the idea of progress, indeed as a crisis of secularity itself, that one may look for an explanation of the worldwide character of the contemporary religious revival across all civilizations.¹⁶ When secular ideologies appear to have failed or lost much of their force, religion returns to the public arena as a mobilizing or integrating normative force. But it is not religion in the abstract which is returning, nor is it returning everywhere. At most, the crisis of secularity can serve as a common conditioning factor that allows certain religious traditions, which have not yet been weakened excessively by processes of secularization, to respond in certain ways.

Moreover, the case studies presented here indicate that what seems to precipitate the religious response are different types of state intervention and administrative colonization of the lifeworld and the private sphere. Such a response could be interpreted, therefore, as a defensive reaction along lines similar to those used by Habermas to analyze the "new social movements."¹⁷ The mobilization of Protestant fundamentalism was clearly a response to state rulings coming from the Supreme Court, the Internal Revenue Service, and Congress. Even in the Catholic cases, where the internal reformation of the Catholic tradition associated with Vatican II was crucial, the role of state penetration as a precipitating factor in the transformations of Polish, Latin-American, and U.S. Catholicism was equally important.

In Poland, Catholic resistance and church-state conflicts were part of the struggle for the right to a private and social sphere free from totalitarian state intervention. But the transformation of Polish Catholicism marks the passage from a struggle centered around the corporatist interests of the church as an institution to a struggle first for human and national rights and then, after the founding of KOR and the emergence of Solidarity, for the rights of civil society to autonomy and self-determination.

In Latin America, the development of liberation theology was at first primarily a response to processes of capitalist expansion and colonization of the traditional lifeworld. But the radicalization of the church as an institution and its confrontation with the state throughout Latin America were a reaction to the institutionalization of the national security state and its violent penetration of the lifeworld—to the indiscriminate violation of human rights, the widespread and systematic use of torture, and the rapid increase in the number of “desaparecidos,” victims of a new form of state terror.

Even in the United States, it was the 1973 Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion by subsuming it under a woman's right to privacy that galvanized the American Catholic church into the political arena, beginning the process that led the bishops to expand the principle of the moral protection of human life and of the sacred dignity of the human person to the two main subsystems, capitalist markets and sovereign states.

Looking particularly at those forms of religious intervention in the public sphere which have emerged in an advanced modern society like the United States, one could say that the deprivatization of modern religion has assumed three main forms. There is, first, the religious mobilization in defense of the traditional lifeworld against various forms of state or market penetration. The mobilization of Protestant fundamentalism and, to a certain extent, the Catholic mobilization against abortion can be seen as examples of this first form of deprivatization.

The argument presented here has been that even in those cases in which religious mobilization could be explained simply as a traditionalist response to modern processes of universalization, which are promoted or protected by state juridical interventions and which disrupt, for instance, the traditional patriarchal family or established patterns of racial or gender discrimination, the deprivatization of religion may have an important public function. By entering the public sphere and forcing the public discussion or contestation of certain issues, religions force modern societies to reflect publicly and collectively upon their normative structures. Naturally, one should not minimize the dangers a traditionalist backlash or a fundamentalist project of restoration may pose to modern normative structures. But in the very process of entering the modern public sphere, religions and normative traditions are also forced to confront and possibly come to terms with modern normative structures. Such a public encounter may permit the reflexive rationalization of the lifeworld and may open the way for the institutionalization of processes of practical rationalization.

A second form of deprivatization is manifested in those cases in which

religions enter the public sphere of modern societies to question and contest the claims of the two major societal systems, states and markets, to function according to their own intrinsic functionalist norms without regard to extrinsic traditional moral norms. By questioning the morality of national security doctrines and the inhuman premises of nuclear defense policies, based on MAD scenarios, ready to sacrifice immeasurable numbers of human beings for the sake of state sovereignty and superpower supremacy, religions remind both states and their citizens of the human need to subordinate the logic of state formation to “the common good.” Similarly, by questioning the inhuman claims of capitalist markets to function in accordance with impersonal and amoral self-regulating mechanisms, religions may remind individuals and societies of the need to check and regulate those impersonal market mechanisms to ensure that they are accountable for the human, social, and ecological damage they may cost and that they may become more responsible to human needs. Moreover, transnational religions are in a particularly advantageous position to remind all individuals and all societies that under modern conditions of globalization “the common good” can increasingly be defined only in global, universal, human terms and that, consequently, the public sphere of modern civil societies cannot have national or state boundaries.

There is moreover a third form of deprivatization of religion connected with the obstinate insistence of traditional religions on maintaining the very principle of a “common good” against individualist modern liberal theories which would reduce the common good to the aggregated sum of individual choices. As long as they respect the ultimate right and duty of the individual conscience to make moral decisions, by bringing into the public sphere issues which liberal theories have decreed to be private affairs, religions remind individuals and modern societies that morality can only exist as an intersubjective normative structure and that individual choices only attain a “moral” dimension when they are guided or informed by intersubjective, interpersonal norms. Reduced to the private sphere of the individual self, morality must necessarily dissolve into arbitrary decisionism. By bringing publicity into the private moral sphere and by bringing into the public sphere issues of private morality, religions force modern societies to confront the task of reconstructing reflexively and collectively their own normative foundations. By doing so, they aid in the process of practical rationalization of the traditional lifeworld and of their own normative traditions.

If the thesis presented so far is correct, the recent transformations of religion analyzed in this study are qualitatively different from what is usually understood as “the return of the sacred.” The deprivatization of

religion cannot be understood either as an antimodern or as a postmodern phenomenon. None of the religious phenomena presented here can be viewed meaningfully as instances of the kind of modern privatized religiosity which, in my view, is the true harbinger of the postmodern condition. All are grounded in that foundational tradition which Richard Niebuhr called radical monotheism.¹⁸ All still publicly uphold universalistic normative and truth claims. The critique of Enlightenment rationalism and of the teleological grand narratives of progress and secular redemption—a critique usually associated with postmodern discourse—may have legitimated and facilitated, at least indirectly, the rehabilitation of those religious traditions which had usually been the target of rationalist critique. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to find either direct links or elective affinities between postmodernity and the public resurgence of religion.¹⁹ As already indicated, it would seem more appropriate to view the public interventions of religion analyzed here as immanent critiques of particular forms of institutionalization of modernity from a modern normative perspective.

If correct, and beyond the relevance it may have for the sociology of religion, such an argument should have further implications for two general areas of sociology. In the first place, it may have relevance for theories of social integration by suggesting a specifically modern type of social integration through the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society. Such a model of modern social integration would present an alternative to the customary ways of conceiving social integration either through administrative state coordination or through self-regulating market mechanisms, through aggregated individual exchanges or through self-regulating systemic differentiation. According to this model, modern social integration emerges in and through the discursive and agonic participation of individuals, groups, social movements, and institutions in a public yet undifferentiated sphere of civil society where the collective construction and reconstruction, contestation, and affirmation of common normative structures—"the common good"—takes place. Unlike functionalist theories of normative societal integration, however, such a theory does not conceptualize modern civil societies as a homogeneous societal community sharing common norms and values but, rather, as a space and a process of public social interaction through which common norms and solidarities may be constructed and reconstructed. In other words, common norms cannot be presupposed as the premise and foundation of a modern social order but, rather, as the potential and always fragile outcome of a process of communicative interaction. Through such a process of communicative interaction in the public sphere of modern civil societies, normative traditions can be reflexively reconstructed—

that is, rationalized—and the differentiated subsystems of modern societies can be made responsible to a publicly defined "common good." By going "public," religions as well as other normative traditions can, therefore, contribute to the vitality of such a public sphere.

It should be obvious that this conception is very close to the theory of modern societies developed by Jürgen Habermas and to theories of civil society which build upon his theory.²⁰ Indeed, the main purpose of this study has been not so much to revise old theories of secularization as to examine the roles which religions and religious movements could still play in furthering processes of practical rationalization. In his reconstruction of Weber's Protestant ethic thesis Habermas has postulated the counterfactual hypothesis that, had the radical communitarian wing of the Reformation been the one to gain hegemony instead of the ascetic wing, perhaps instrumental rationalization would not have expanded so one-sidedly at the expense of practical rationalization.²¹ Yet one of the conclusions one could derive from the case studies presented here is that, in the same way in which the deprivatization of religion raises questions for functionalist theories of secularization, what could be called the practical-rational potential of those religious movements also raises similar questions for Habermas's secularist theory of modernity.

The relevant issue here is not whether Habermas himself should or should not be interested in religious movements or in the role religion could possibly play in the reconstitution of the public sphere. The problem is whether Habermas's rigid theory of modern differentiation leaves any room open for such an interest. If religion is only the unity of culture before its modern differentiation into the cognitive, the moral-practical, and the aesthetic-expressive spheres, then religion is only an anachronism or a residue without much relevance or future. Religion may have a relevant past, as shown by Habermas's own counterfactual hypothesis concerning the radical ethical visions of brotherhood, which were, however, excluded historically by the institutionalized selectivity of capitalist modernity. Religion may even have a present in Habermas's theory in protecting defensively what little is left of traditional lifeworlds from state administrative penetration and from capitalist colonization. But religion has no future. In Habermas's model, conventional religion ought to be superseded by postconventional secular morality.

In addition to the obvious cognitive question concerning the empirical adequacy of such a theory in accounting for ongoing historical processes, there are two issues of practical relevance for those interested in advancing what Habermas calls "the unfinished project of modernity." The first issue has to do with the old problem of theory and practice. If, as Marx put it, "it is not enough that thought should strive to realize itself; reality

must itself strive towards thought," could it be the case here that "the philosophical head" is not attentive enough to its own "heart," to what could become "its material weapon"?²² Put in more Weberian terms, there is a need to identify the historical carriers of processes of moral-practical rationalization. Following Habermas's critique of Weber's nearly exclusive emphasis upon processes of instrumental rationalization, one could say that Weber's greatest contribution—the discovery of the crucial historical relevance of the economic ethics of the world religions for differential processes of instrumental rationalization—may have predisposed him to neglect the importance of the political ethics of the world religions for processes of moral-practical rationalization. What Weber said about "economic ethics," however, ought to be applicable also to "political ethics":

This term does not bring into focus the ethical theories of theological compendia; for however important such compendia may be under certain circumstances, they merely serve as tools of knowledge. The term "economic ethic" points to the practical impulses for action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic contexts of religions.²³

One should, therefore, distinguish between cognitive, intellectual contributions to moral-practical discourse and the historical institutionalization of moral-practical principles and norms. If Peter Brown was correct in pointing out that, while early Christianity may have made almost no innovation in moral matters, nonetheless it played a crucial historical role by "democratizing" the philosophers' upper-class culture and by putting into practice "what pagan and Jewish moralists had already begun to preach,"²⁴ then one may offer the conjecture, partially supported by the case studies presented in this work, that today as always religious organizations and religious movements continue to play similar historical roles. In three of the five cases studied here, religious movements and organizations played direct, immediate roles in processes of democratization. In the other two cases, religion played some role in enlivening the public sphere of civil society either directly, by raising publicly normative issues concerning the systemic functioning of the administrative state and the capitalist economy, or indirectly, by reacting to processes of administrative or juridical penetration of the lifeworld and, thereby, opening up for public debate normative issues concerning the very structure of the modern lifeworld.

In principle, there is neither need nor reason to privilege religion as the sole or main, direct or indirect carrier of processes of moral-practical rationalization. In the modern world, other secular movements and organizations have been, are, and will likely continue to be at least as impor-

tant carriers as religion. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that without religion the public square must be "naked."²⁵ But the actual continuous presence of religion in most moral-practical struggles of the modern world, frequently on both sides of every issue, tends to indicate that there is also no reason, other than secularist or rationalist prejudice and the conviction that there can be no such a thing as a "modern," that is, postconventional religion, why in principle a theory of moral-practical rationalization should systematically neglect religion.

This points precisely to a second practical issue, namely, to the danger of elitist, rationalist bias. Although some recent trends in the self-conceptualization of science and the self-understanding of professional scientific identities tend to put into question any rigid separation even at this level, nonetheless one could argue that at least when it comes to the cognitive sphere, one still needs to maintain a clear and rigid separation between science and religion.²⁶ For instance, there may be room for "belief" in creation or for symbolic, even mythical, language concerning the cosmos. But there can be no such thing as "creation science." But when it comes to the moral-practical and the subjective-expressive spheres, one may wonder whether such a rigid, clear-cut differentiation is possible, necessary, or helpful. One may justifiably question whether a theory which so clearly privileges intellectual rational discourse and a tradition of thought which so clearly privileges the aesthetic realm may not be oblivious to the fact that for ordinary people in most societies throughout the world religion and religious traditions continue to be an accessible and legitimate vehicle for moral-practical reflection and for intersubjective expression. In any case, before discarding contemporary religious movements as either anachronistic or purely defensive reactions, one would need to prove that ultimately there is incompatibility between religion and modern structures of consciousness.

I would agree, of course, that only a religion which has incorporated as its own the central aspects of the Enlightenment critique of religion is in a position today to play a positive role in furthering processes of practical rationalization. Only a religious tradition which reformulates its relationship to modernity by incorporating reflexively the three dimensions of the Enlightenment critique of religion—the cognitive critique of traditional religious worldviews, the moral-practical critique of religious ideologies of legitimization, and the subjective-expressive critique of religious asceticism and alienation—while upholding publicly the sacred values of modernity, that is, human life and freedom, may contribute to the revitalization of the modern public sphere. But the very resurgence or reassertion of religious traditions may be viewed as a sign of the failure of the Enlightenment to redeem its own promises in each of

these spheres. Religious traditions are now confronting the differentiated secular spheres, challenging them to face their own obscurantist, ideological, and inauthentic claims. In many of these confrontations, it is religion which, as often as not, appears to be on the side of human enlightenment.

Western modernity has lost some of its haughty self-assurance and is beginning to manifest some doubts about its arrogant attitude toward the other, precisely at a time when the attempt to transcend itself from within through socialism has apparently failed. Meanwhile the two dynamos of modernity, the capitalist market and the administrative state, continue their self-propelled march toward a world system, wrecking and challenging every premodern tradition and life form that stands in their way. Some of these traditions accommodate and accept the private niche reserved for them in the cultural marketplace, where they may even thrive in the modern or postmodern pantheon.

Others, particularly non-Western traditions, emboldened by modernity's self-doubts, are able to reaffirm their own identity against the modern West. If Weber was correct when he argued that ascetic Protestantism played some role in helping to shape the particular historical form which the institutionalization of modern differentiation and the privatization of religion assumed in the West, theories of secularization and modernization should be open to the possibility that other religions may also play some role in institutionalizing their own particular patterns of secularization.

Finally, there are those traditions which have maintained an uneasy relationship with modernity, partly accommodating, partly recognizing some of modernity's values as their own but refusing to accept the claims of the market and the state that moral norms ought not to interfere with their systemic logic of self-reproduction through the media of money and power. Through their ongoing critical encounter with modernity, those traditions may be in a position to further both the processes of practical rationalization and the unfinished project of modernity.

Western modernity is at a crossroads. If it does not enter into a creative dialogue with the other, with those traditions which are challenging its identity, modernity will most likely triumph. But it may end up being devoured by the inflexible, inhuman logic of its own creations. It would be profoundly ironic if, after all the beatings it has received from modernity, religion could somehow unintentionally help modernity save itself.

Notes

Part One

1. By contrast, in the English translation, the term and the people behind it were flattened into the secular "the wretched of the earth." See Said Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93–94.
2. Gustavo Gutiérrez, *Power of the Poor in History* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1983).
3. Vaclav Havel, *Power of the Powerless* (New York: Sharpe, 1990).
4. Cf. Michael Walzer, *Exodus and Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), and Ernst Bloch, *Man on His Own* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970).
5. From among the immense literature on the "new" religious movements, see David Bromley and Philip E. Hammond, eds., *The Future of New Religious Movements* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987); Eileen Barker, ed., *New Religious Movements* (New York: Mellen, 1982); Charles Glock and Robert Bellah, eds., *The New Religious Consciousness* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Rodney Stark, ed., *Religious Movements: Genesis, Exodus, Numbers* (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1984); Steven Tipton, *Getting Saved from the Sixties* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Bryan Wilson, ed., *The Social Impact of New Religious Movements* (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1981); Robert Wuthnow, *The Consciousness Reformation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
6. Mary Douglas, "The Effects of Modernization on Religious Change," in Mary Douglas and Steven M. Tipton, eds., *Religion and America. Spirituality in a Secular Age*, p. 25 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1982).
7. One could add that Catholicism is the largest and one of the most understudied religions. The sociology of Catholicism is still underdeveloped.
8. Whether this new trend will turn out to be a permanent or rather a merely transitory phenomenon is, of course, the kind of question to which only very tentative and speculative answers might be given.

Chapter One

1. On the ongoing "secularization debate," compare, on the one hand, Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion* (Berkeley: Uni-

transnational Catholic links. For these and other survey results, see Hunter and Rice, "Unlikely Alliances," pp. 232–39; and Gallup and Castelli, *American Catholic People*, pp. 70–76, 80–87, 91–102. For the May 1992 Gallup poll, see *New York Times*, 19 June 1992.

137. Cf. Philip Berryman, *Our Unfinished Business: The U.S. Catholic Bishops' Letters on Peace and the Economy* (New York: Pantheon, 1989); and George E. McCarthy and Royal W. Rhodes, *Eclipse of Justice: Ethics, Economics, and the Lost Tradition of American Catholicism* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1991).

138. John Richard Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984).

139. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); Alisdair McIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Alan Wolfe, *Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

140. Andrew Greeley has pointed out that close to 80 percent of regular church attendees reject the official birth control teaching and that more than one-third of those who reject the church's teaching on premarital sex receive Holy Communion as often as they attend church. See Greeley, *American Catholics since the Council*, pp. 64–71. On the new Catholicism, see further, Eugene Kennedy, *Re-Imagining American Catholicism* (New York: Vintage, 1985) and *Tomorrow's Catholics. Yesterday's Church. The Two Cultures of American Catholicism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).

141. Gallup and Castelli, *American Catholic People*, p. 184.

142. *Ibid.*

143. "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," no. 76, in Abbott, *Documents*.

144. Cf. Bishop Raymond A. Lucker, "Justice in the Church: The Church as Example," in Coleman, *Hundred Years*; and Hans Küng and Leonard Swidler, *The Church in Anguish* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986).

Chapter Eight

1. For representative statements of these positions, see n. 1 of chap. 1.

2. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); and Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1936).

3. It was of course the thrust of Tocqueville's comparative historical analysis of democratization in France and the United States that these structural trends can assume very different patterns and forms and that the different legacies of the ancien régime notwithstanding, historical actors could do something to influence the different direction of those patterns.

4. This would also seem to be the lesson of the Iranian revolution. Thus, it is simply shortsighted to view—as does Karel Dobbelare from the perspective

of a Luhmannian functionalist theory of secularization—the resistance of the Polish Catholic church to the Communist regime or the resistance of the Shi'ite Ulama to the shah's regime simply or even primarily as a fundamentalist hierocratic reaction against evolutionary processes of modernization. Fundamentalist hierocratic reactions could not have been that instrumental in toppling both regimes, nor can such an interpretation explain the alliances of the religious and the secular leftist oppositions to both regimes. That today the religious and the secular components of the two alliances occupy very different positions in both postrevolutionary regimes only shows that one is dealing here with different types of public religion. See Karel Dobbelare, "The Secularization of Society? Some Methodological Suggestions," In Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson Shupe, eds., *Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered* (New York: Paragon House, 1989).

5. Here I have followed particularly Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); and Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

6. Seyla Benhabib, "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition and Jürgen Habermas," in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).

7. One of the aims of the comparative historical studies has been precisely to show that there are many different forms of Catholicism.

8. On modern Shi'ite hierocracy, see Said A. Ariojmand, "Shi'ite Jurisprudence and Constitution-Making in the Islamic Republic of Iran," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics, and Militance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), and "Millennial Beliefs, Hierocratic Authority and Revolution in Shi'ite Iran," in Ariojmand, ed., *The Political Dimensions of Religion* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1993). The traditional Islamic *umma* also had its own internal restricted public sphere. It is the transposition of the *umma* onto a modern mobilizational state that gives it its theocratic-totalitarian direction. On the tradition of Islamic public criticism and efforts to modernize it in Saudi Arabia, see Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), chap. 6.

9. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).

10. Ralph Della Cava, "Vatican Policy, 1978–90: An Updated Overview," *Social Research* 59, no. 1 (Spring 1992).

11. John S. Coleman, S.J., "Raison d'église: Organizational Imperatives of the Church in the Political Order," in Jeffrey Hadden and Anson Shupe, eds., *Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered* (New York: Paragon House, 1989).

12. Daniel Bell, "The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of Religion," *British Journal of Sociology* 28, no. 4 (1997); and Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cultural Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

13. Roland Robertson and JoAnn Chirico, "Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Explanation," *Sociological Analysis* 46, no. 3 (1985).

14. All significant differences notwithstanding, the situation of Islam is similar in this respect.

15. Cf. Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 475, and "Individualism and the Intellectuals," in *Émile Durkheim: On Morality and Society*, Robert N. Bellah, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

16. Cf. Gabriel Almond, Marvin Chodorow, and Roy Harvey Pearce, eds., *Progress and Its Discontents* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Robert Bellah, "New Religious Consciousness and the Crisis of Modernity," in Charles Glock and Robert Bellah, eds., *The New Religious Consciousness* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); and Peter Berger, "From the Crisis of Religion to the Crisis of Secularity," in Mary Douglas and Steven Tipton, eds., *Religion and America: Spirituality in a Secular Age* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983).

17. See Jürgen Habermas, "New Social Movements," and Axel Honneth et al., "The Dialectics of Rationalization: An Interview with Jürgen Habermas," *Telos* 49 (Fall 1981). See also chap. 6, n. 62.

18. H. Richard Niebuhr, *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

19. For such an attempt, see Harvey Cox, *Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).

20. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984–87); and Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*.

21. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, pp. 143–271.

22. Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," in *Early Writings* (New York: Vintage, 1975), pp. 252 and 257.

23. Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 267.

24. Peter Brown, "Late Antiquity," in Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby, eds., *A History of Private Life*, vol. 1, *From Pagan Rome to Byzantium* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 260.

25. This is the thesis of John Richard Neuhaus's *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984).

26. Robert Wuthnow has offered the intriguing hypothesis that the reason for the widespread irreligion one finds among social scientists may derive from the social science discipline's own insecurity and from their related need to maintain a clear and rigid separation between the two cognitive fields. According to Wuthnow, the more precarious the cognitive status of any scientific discipline, the greater the professional need to maintain an irreligious attitude. Robert Wuthnow, "Science and the Sacred," in Phillip E. Hammond, ed., *The Sacred in a Secular Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 187–203.

It is interesting to observe that the calls for a new synthesis between science and religion tend to come today more frequently from natural scientists and laymen, "awed" by new scientific discoveries that continue to reveal the ever greater "mystery" of the universe, than from theologians. The latter's reluctance to link once again cognitive religious structures to science should not be surprising given negative past experiences, as well as the increasingly shorter durability and ever more precarious character of modern scientific paradigms. For some recent religious inspirations coming from postmodern science, cf. Stephen Toulmin, *The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of Nature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Huston Smith, *Beyond the Postmodern Mind* (New York: Crossroad, 1982); John M. Templeton and Robert L. Herrmann, *The God Who Would Be Known: Revelations of the Divine in Contemporary Science* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989).