

Religion between Last Judgement, Law, and Faith: Koranic *dīn* and its rendering in Latin translations of the Koran

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1. *Religio* as a Latin term in Antiquity and the Middle Ages

The concept of religion, whether as a countable or an uncountable abstract noun designating a basic orientation of cultural life that is both individually and socially important, is not only fundamental for religious studies. In modern countries this concept still frames the citizens' general attitude to their cultural institutions, sciences and humanities, whether in positive or negative terms, and thus serves them to position their personal and social ethics.

In European history, as is well known, the concept of religionⁱⁱ underwent far-reaching changes which were described and documented especially by Ernst Feil in major studies.ⁱⁱⁱ Although Feil showed that the main features of today's concept of religion in Europe reach back to Antiquity (especially to Cicero's works), he also pointed out that, in the Early Modern Period and in the aftermath of the Reformation, it was reinterpreted as a basic, almost natural phenomenon rooted in human mentality and emotion. "Religion", Feil argued, became coincidental with "religiosity"^{iv}; and the uncountable abstract use of the term came to dominate the philosophical and critical study of religion. This even linked up with the ancient meaning of Latin *religio* (as diligence and piety in the worship of gods) known from Antiquity and Late Antiquity. Apart from *religio* designating a virtue, Feil shows that some countable nouns related to the religious field can also be found in the linguistic usage of the Middle Ages, which were meant to provide common notions for the ways of worship among different peoples. But the words used in that context were *lex* or *secta* (also including the collective semantic component of "followers"), not *religio*. Only in the 16th century, during and after the Reformation, did *religio* come to be used in a Christian context for the "natural" forms of worship that already existed before the divine revelation. An increasingly internalized understanding of this term then developed from the late 17th century onwards.

This is not the place to exhaustively discuss the history of the term *religio*.^v A few remarks may suffice at this point. It is partly correct that central aspects of the concept prevailing in the Early Modern Period go back to Cicero. In pre-classical Latin and also in the early speeches of Cicero with an inclination towards everyday language, *religio* is certainly used in the sense of religious awe and scrupulous dealing with the divine, thereby almost synonymous with *pietas*. But in Cicero's late works, and most notably in his religious writings, a more general meaning is suggested: the Epicureans, for instance, are accused of having eliminated "religion" (*religionem funditus sustulerunt*, nat. deor. 1,118), whereas the Stoic Lucilius is said to have sufficiently defended "religion" (*satis enim defensa religio est ... a Lucilio*, div. 1,9). The fight against superstition does not, in the Stoics' view, remove "religion" as such (*nec vero superstitione tollenda religio tollitur*, div. 2,148). The traditional meaning certainly remains present, for instance when it is stated that the ancient Romans possessed such a great religious awe that some commanders even sacrificed themselves to the gods for the republic (*at vero apud maiores tanta religionis vis fuit, ut quidam imperatores etiam se ipsos dis immortalibus ... pro re publica devoverent*, nat. deor. 2,10). Especially the plural *religiones* in Cicero's writings always denotes religious rites, cults, institutions and prescriptions (mostly) of the Romans, occasionally also those of other peoples (leg. 2,15; nat. deor. 1,61; div. 1,105). This is ultimately mirrored in the etymology of the term offered by Cicero: for him, *religio* is derived from *relegere* ('collect anew, gather together'). The ancestors had painstakingly searched and 'collected anew', as it were, everything related to the cult of the gods (*qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent*, nat. deor. 2,72).

The innovative use of *religio* as an uncountable abstract noun, which is tangible in the aforementioned quotations, does not appear to be Cicero's invention but seems to go back to the Epicureans. This becomes apparent in Cicero's polemics against them: by the Epicureans, any kind of religion was regarded as superstition. Indeed the term *religio* is used for the first time in Latin in that general sense for religious concepts and practices by Lucretius (died ca. 55 BC): people were oppressed by "religion" (*oppressa gravi sub religione*, Lucr. 1,63), which generated criminal and

wicked deeds (*religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta*, Lucr. 1,83) and led to many evils (*tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*, Lucr. 1,101). Epicurus trampled “religion” under foot (*religio pedibus subiecta*, Lucr. 1,78) and thus freed human beings from the fear of “religion”, as Cicero also attests (*contra metum religionis*, fin. 1,64). These few examples already illustrate the two different concepts of *religio* at hand: first, a cultic meaning, both in singular and plural use (i.e. the observance of religious prescriptions as well as these prescriptions themselves, and the fear of violating them), second, an abstract philosophical term, as an uncountable singular noun (i.e. “religion” in the modern sense of the word).^{vi} We do not find a plural usage of the philosophical concept denoting different “religions”.

The post-Ciceronian usage of *religio* mostly follows the first, cultic meaning. Thus the biographer Suetonius describes the emperors’ attitudes towards Roman cults by using the plural term (*circa religiones*, Aug. 90,1; Tib.69,1). In a similar way other authors sometimes use the term *religiones* in the context of foreign cults, but never of foreign religions in general (cf. already Caesar, bell. Gall. 6,13,4: *Druides ... religiones interpretantur*, “the Druids determine the cults”). Neither does Tacitus refer to a *religio* of the Germans or Jews nor Apuleius to one of Isis (he once, however, uses the expression *turba inops religionis*, “a crowd without religion”, De deo Socr. 3,3). A rare exception is Catullus’s phrase *Persarum impia religio*, “the godless religion of the Persians” (c. 90,4).

In his work programmatically entitled ‘De vera religione’ (389/90 AD),^{vii} Augustine attempts to give a synthesis of the cultic and the philosophical meaning of *religio*, i.e. the distinction between the domains of a state religion and natural theology as developed earlier by Varro. Although Tertullian (Apol. 24,2; 35,1), Minucius Felix (Octav. 1,5) and Lactantius (Inst. 4) had already opposed pagan *religio* to Christian *vera religio* (as does Augustine himself in case of Manichaeism in his ‘Contra Faustum’ [cf., e.g., 13,1 *et saepius*]),^{viii} it is only Augustine who reflects on the term itself, viz. in the context of ‘true’ philosophy: the Platonists were philosophically quasi correct but were not concerned with cult; Christianity in contrast now forms a union of Platonic philosophy and the (true) cult and thus becomes *vera religio*, i.e. *religio* in its full sense. Other ‘religions’, in which cult and philosophical reasoning remain apart, do not fall under the term ‘true religion’ and cannot be referred to as religion at

all. Even the etymology is different, as *religio* is derived here from *religare*, 'to connect', i.e. to the one and true God (*vera rel.* 113). The Augustinian synthesis of the philosophical concept of religion with the ancient cultic meaning in a new context which was based on Cicero but implied a restriction of the term to the Christian *vera religio*, thus forestalled any further development of a universal concept of religion applicable to all "religions".

Consequently, in theoretical debates about other religions in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages mostly terms such as *secta* (always pejorative) or Greek *haeresis* were used. The Jewish religion takes on a special role, which is from a Christian point of view also not regarded as a *religio* in its own right but, in a Paulinian sense, as a necessary precursor of the *vera religio* that has to be overcome. Here the concept of law (*lex, scil. Moysi*) is central. In his commentary to Paul's epistle to the Romans, Augustine systematised the Paulinian theology of law and distinguished between four periods within the history of humankind: *ante legem* (paganism), *sub lege* (Judaism), *sub gratia* (Christianity), and *in pace* (eschatological status).^{ix} This distinction remained central throughout the Middle Ages, and Nicholas of Cusa still refers to it in his vision 'De pace(!) fidei': his often-quoted formula *religio una in rituum varietate* (De pace fid. 1,6; cf. also 6,16) does not mean that the many 'religions' will become one in the end, but that there has always been only one 'true' religion, namely the Christian one (cf. also De docta ign. III 8,229: *nulla perfecta religio* apart from the Christian). Hence Cusa is – in his work 'De pace fidei', *nota bene* – not yet a forerunner of an abstract notion of religion in the modern sense (see, however, below); he instead confirms the Augustinian concept of a *vera religio* and even radicalises it, as for him there is only one religion (*religio una*) at all.

To sum up, one can say that there are the beginnings of an uncountable abstract use of *religio* in ancient philosophy (Lucretius, Cicero) which is picked up by Christian authors but coloured with an exclusivist connotation: *religio* indeed becomes uncountable because there is only one (true) religion. As rightly stated by Feil, semantic change in the modern period once more departed from this, moving towards an inclusivist abstract notion. *Religio*, then, came to denote everything that can be subsumed under 'religion' – and that is by no means a tautological phrase.

2. The concept of *dīn* in the late antique Middle East

For a better assessment of the early forms of a generalized concept of religion in the Mediterranean region it is worthwhile to consider the religious landscape of the Middle East in a comparative perspective. Especially promising in that context is the Arabic term *dīn*, which belongs to the core of the Islamic religious terminology. The term also has its own history. It is quite significant for our purpose that it is used in the Koran and in the major works of the Prophetic Tradition almost exclusively as a singular^x. It can equally be shown that there are also two quite different semantic strands of *dīn* to be distinguished in the Koran. The first is the notion “judgement”, which can be traced back to various older Semitic languages from Akkadian to Hebrew and Syriac.^{xi} The second, which is of special importance for our present purpose, is indeed “religion”, which may denote worship in general as regulated by faith, cult and law, and also its adherents. This last notion was by no means restricted to Islam. Its dominant use as an uncountable abstract noun, at times already with a collective connotation, might be ascribed to Persian and Mazdaistic roots. It becomes obvious that the Old and Middle Persian usage of the term reflects an understanding which is in many ways close to today’s general concept of religion and comprises cultic and legal as well as psychological dimensions.

The notable juxtaposition of the two aforementioned meanings of *dīn* in the Koran can also be identified to some extent in the Syriac linguistic usage of the Jacobite and Nestorian churches in the Middle East. Their literature emerged to a large extent within the Sassanid Empire and developed in close linguistic contact with Middle Persian. If one starts out from the common versions of the chronological order of the Koranic revelations, the transition from the first to the second meaning in the Koran can already be observed in the Meccan period. The discussion about the origins and development of the Koran, however, is still in considerable flux at the moment, and many crucial questions in this field have to remain open at this point. The same also holds true for the hotly debated Syriac influence on the Koran. The term *dīn* in any case suggests that, even in the early stages of the revelation, Islam was already facing an interrelated stock of Syriac and Iranian notions. As in other cases it built on already existing religious and cultural patterns and frames. Apart from the general concept of religion, which was already established in Islam in its early period, other

collective terms were used to express the relationship to other religious communities (*milla*, *niḥla* and *others*). The basic view, however, that all human beings are equipped with a form of *dīn* remained uncontested throughout, even if Islam claimed to offer its complete and original form which had been given to all human beings.

In the light of the development of the Latin term *religio* outlined above it is interesting to ask how the Latin translations of the Koran rendered the term *dīn*. Feil analyses this in an appendix of his work^{xii} and emphasizes that *religio* does not emerge as a translation for *dīn* until the late 17th century with Ludovico Marracci (see below). This seems to confirm his thesis of the late development of a generalized concept of religion. However, a closer look at the earlier translations is in order. Based on a broader selection of data we can attempt explanations that avoid the danger of a *petitio principii* in this question. The place of the Koran translations within the semantic development as a whole should also be reconsidered. Did they follow the general trend and support it, or did they work in the opposite direction? Was there a convergence or correlation of Islamic and Christian concepts of religion? Is the singularized use of the word in the Koran also reflected in the translations?

3. *Dīn* in the Koran and its different meanings

Dīn can be regarded as a key concept of the Koran. 94 instances are distributed almost evenly among the surahs that are commonly rated among the Meccan and Medinan period of the revelation (Meccan: 48 citations – Medinan: 46 citations).^{xiii}

Scholars of the Koran realised early on that the different meanings of the term show a complementary distribution among the various surahs. In the first group *dīn* is mostly used in the context of the promise of the *yaum ad-dīn*, i.e. of the Day of Judgement at the end of time. The texts describe the day when the living and the dead are summoned and either rewarded or punished for their deeds, in many gripping pictures. They urge their audience to believe in this day, and challenge those who are not convinced of a coming judgement, regard it as a lie and mock at the very idea of resurrection. Here, *dīn* can be translated as “judgement, reckoning, retribution”.^{xiv} As Yvonne Haddad and Patrice C. Brodeur^{xv} show, these surahs bring *dīn* to mind as a future event that will be brought about by God and that people

have to take into account in their thought and actions in order to avoid ending up in fear and terror. If one follows the traditional chronology^{xvi}, this group of surahs can be assigned to the first and second Meccan period:

māliki yaumi d-dīn “owner of the Day of Judgement” (1:4); *wa-qālū wailanā hādā yaumu d-dīn* “and they say: Ah, woe for us! This is the Day of Judgement” (37:20); *wa-inna ‘alaika la‘natī ilā yaumi d-dīn* “And lo! My curse is on thee till the Day of Judgement” (38:78).

In the second, far more frequent usage *dīn* is something that belongs to human beings as individuals and as a community, as can be gathered from the frequent combination of the word with the possessive suffixes in the singular or, more often, in the plural form:

Lakum dīnukum wa-liya dīnī “unto you your religion, and unto me my religion” (109:6); *in kuntum fī šakkin min dīnī* “if you are in doubt of my religion” (10:104); *allaḏīna farraqū dīnahum wa-kānū šiya‘an* (6:159) “as for those who sundered their religion and became schismatics”; *an yubaddila dīnakum* “(I fear) that he will alter your religion” (40:26); *garra hā‘ulā‘i dīnuhum* “their religion hath deluded these” (8:49).

This *dīn* can more generally denote “custom, justice, order”, as in the Koranic example of the story of Joseph when the drinking vessel he has hidden in his youngest brother’s luggage is discovered and he is about to be enslaved:

mā kāna li-ya‘ḥuḏa aḥāhu fī dīni l-maliki “he (Joseph) could not have taken his brother according to the king’s law/custom” (12:76).^{xvii}

This meaning seems to be pervasive in Old Arabic (see below), but in the Koran it is an exception. *Dīn* is rendered there as a pure form that God fixed in the nature (*fiṭra*) of Man:

aqim waḡhaka li-d-dīni ḥanīfan fiṭrata llāhi llatī faṭara n-nāsa ‘alaihā lā tabdīla li-ḥalqi llāhi ḡālika ad-dīn al-qayyimu wa-lākinna akṭara n-nāsi lā ya‘lamūn “So set thy purpose (O Muḥammad) for religion as a man by nature upright – the nature (*fiṭra*) (framed by) Allah, in which He hath created man. There is no altering (the laws of) Allah’s creation. That is the right religion, but most men know not” (30:30).

People can also abuse it for games and distraction (*ittaḥādū dīnahum la‘iban wa-lahwan*, 6:70; *lahwan wa-la‘iban*, 7:51); they split it and then form separated

groups (6:159, see above; 30:32). Its central actions are worshipping (Arab. verb *‘abada/ya‘budu*, e.g. 10:104; 109) and invocation (Arab. verb *da‘ā/yad‘ū*, e.g. 7:29, 40:14). Worship has come to be directed towards different gods and other objects, but in its original, pure form it belongs to the One God alone:

lahū mā fī s-samawāti wa-l-arḍi wa-lahū d-dīnu wāṣiban “Unto Him belongeth whatsoever is in the heavens and the earth, and religion is His for ever” (16:52); *a-lā lillāhi ad-dīnu l-ḥāliṣu* “Surely pure religion is for Allah only” (39:3).

People are called upon to invoke God alone and thus dedicate the *dīn* in its pure form to him alone (*muḥliṣīna lahu d-dīna*, 7:29; 10:22; 29:65; 31:32; 40:14, 65; *muḥliṣan lahu dīnī*, 29:14). This is a straight path (*sirāṭ mustaqīm*, 6:161), the right *dīn* (*ad-dīn al-qayyim*, 9:36; 12:40; 30:30; dto. *dīnan qiyaman*, 6:161), the *dīn* of the Ḥanīfs which goes back to the community of Abraham. God has ordained (Arab. verb *šara‘a*) the *dīn* which he already enjoined on Noah for the faithful of the present (42:13).

In the framework of the traditional chronology this use of the term *dīn* appears for the first time towards the end of the first Meccan period (109:6) and is fully established in the surahs of the second and third Meccan period. It also remains present throughout the later revelations (cf. 9:36; 98:5). Further elements are added in surahs of Medinan attribution, such as the statement that the *dīn* should now belong to God alone, something for which its devotees were already fought against and which they themselves should now fight for (2:198; 8:39; 9:33). This is the *dīn* of God (*dīnu llāhi*) (24:2; 110:2). God has sent the prophet with his guidance and the *dīn* of truth (*bi-l-hudā wa-dīni l-ḥaqqi*)^{xviii} in order to make it prevail over all *dīn* (*li-yuḏhirahū ‘alā d-dīni kullihī*, 9:33, see below).^{xix} He will pay the faithful their true *dīn* (*dīnahumu l-ḥaqqa*) at the Day of Judgement (24:25).^{xx} Humankind is already entering the *dīn* of God (*yadhjulūna fī dīni llāhi afwāḡan*, 110:2). These phrases reveal the character of this *dīn* as establishing its particular community and being universal at the same time, which especially comes to the fore in the surahs of the final phase and carries a collective component into its meaning.^{xxi}

This multilayered second usage of *dīn* in the Koran, which can be clearly distinguished from the first one and which also suggests a chronological distinction, is generally translated as “religion”. This is, as Brodeur argues for the English

language, to be understood with a “capital R”, i.e. as an uncountable abstract noun denoting a fundamental human attitude and practice that is meant to be restored to its divinely created origins by means of Islam and thus to reach its completion; this *dīn* of God is referred to as *islām* “surrender”:

inna d-dīna ‘inda llāhi l-islāmu “Lo! religion with Allah (is) the Surrender“ (3:19).

The exclusivist narrowing of the meaning of the general singularized concept of religion in Latin theology of Late Antiquity (see above) can thus also be found in Arabic in connection with the Koran. A plural use of *dīn*, as already stated above, is not attested at all in the Koran and only rarely in the Traditions of the Prophet. This certainly goes along with an increasing number of references to the *dīn* of others - Christians, Jews and Polytheists - in the Koran, which, however, occur only in singular. The others face the accusation of splitting their *dīn*, being led astray by it, having exaggerated opinions (5:77) on it and therefore becoming divided in sections (6:159; 30:32; 8:49). For the respective ethnic or religious groups (both of which are very difficult to distinguish in the Koran in any case) terms such as *umma* or *milla* “people, community” are used.

4. *Dīn* in the linguistic context of the Koran: Arabic and non-Arabic dimensions

Over the centuries, Arabic lexicographic tradition, whose beginnings can be traced to the 2nd/8th century and which can be regarded as reaching its climax in the 18th century with the *Tāj al-‘arūs* of Murtaḍā az-Zabīdī (d. 1791), put together many different meanings of *dīn*. Some of these are attested by verses and sayings supposedly going back to pre- and early Islamic times, but others clearly reflect the development of the Islamic religious linguistic usage.^{xxii} *Dīn* here is related to the word *dayn* “liability, debt”, derived from the same root (*d-y-n*). It comprises various terms from the semantic fields of law and religion but also of dominion and surrender, custom and moral conduct. Apart from these, there are also meanings such as “fine rain” or “disease” which are difficult to place among the others and which illustrate the general difficulties in assessing the value of the sometimes highly divergent information collected by the early Arabic lexicographers.^{xxiii} On the basis of Arabic lexicographical and comparative Semitic studies two main positions have

been argued for in prior research to explain the origin and development of the term *dīn* in the Koran and in Arabic in general. Each of them is represented in one of the two successive editions of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI)*. Theodor Nöldeke^{xxiv} and Karl Vollers^{xxv} after him, as well as D. B. Macdonald in the first edition of the *EI*^{xxvi} argue that the manifold meanings represent an amalgamation of three different Old Arabic, Hebrew-Aramaic and Persian roots, namely: 1. “manner, custom, tradition, habit” from Old Arabic, 2. “judgement”, especially “Day of Judgement” from Judeo-Christian usage in Hebrew and Syriac, as well as 3. “religion” from (Middle) Persian, attested there as *dēn/dīn* (< Old Persian *daēnā*). Vollers regarded the first meaning as derived from the latter and thus stressed the Persian influence on the development of the Arabic-Islamic concept of religion. Similarly, Josef Horowitz^{xxvii} and Karl Ahrens^{xxviii} argued that the meaning “religion” was a semantic borrowing from Persian, which even might have been transmitted directly into Arabic. W. Cantwell Smith also argues along this line, in the framework of his overall picture of an emergence and spread of the notion of “religion” in late antiquity, although he also stresses the affinity of the semantic concepts already inherent in the Arabic word *dīn*, which eased this semantic loan.^{xxix}

The counter-opinion by Maurice Godefroy-Demombynes and especially by Louis Gardet in the second edition of the *EI*^{xxx}, preferred to assume an intra-Arabic development of the various meanings, which unfolded in interaction with Hebrew-Aramaic. The supposed relation of the meaning of *dīn* with the aforementioned term *dayn* (derived from the same root *d-y-n*) “liability, debt” can, according to Gardet, also explain meanings such as “custom, tradition”, “judgement” and finally “religion” in its aspects of orientation, commitment, surrender and retribution. This, he argues, became the most general and most common meaning of *dīn*. He rejects the assumption of Persian and Mazdaistic origins as not convincing. This position is shared also by T. Izutsu. While admitting the possibility of an Iranian etymology for *dīn* “religion”, he prefers a semantic derivation from otherwise attested original meanings of *dīn* like “obedience”, “power”, and possibly “custom”.^{xxxi}

These positions do not only represent two different views on the origins of the Islamic concept of religion but also show clear differences in their basic methodological assumptions. With their preference either for external origins or for

an internal Arabic derivation of the meaning of *dīn* they can be regarded even today as exponents of the still persisting controversy over the origins and early context of Islam. Such clear-cut views tend to ignore, however, that internal and external links and references do not have to be mutually exclusive. An internal development might well correspond to historical changes on a wider scale. For the Koranic phrase *yaum ad-dīn* the connection with the Hebrew or Syriac term denoting the divine Day of Judgement is generally acknowledged, also by Gardet.^{xxxii} The word may well be linked to the existing Arabic components of meaning in the root *d-y-n*, such as “debt, retribution”; the Judaeo-Christian context, however, is equally obvious so that this special meaning can indeed be regarded as a semantic borrowing.

A comprehensive analysis of the different meanings of *dīn* in the context of pre-Islamic and early Islamic poetry and prose still remains to be done. For the usage of *dīn* as “religion” one can provide some Arabic quotations which are claimed to be earlier than the Koran, as they are attributed to pre-Islamic poets. Thus an-Nābiḡa aḏ-Ḍubyanī (fl. 570-600) praises the Christian Ġassānids in the Golan area of Syria, who were Byzantine vassals and Christian themselves, for their “upright religion” (*wa-dīnuhum qawīmun*), in a phrase that already strongly recalls the Koranic expression (*ad-dīnu l-qayyimu*, 9:36; 12:40; 30:30; 30:43; derived from the same root *q-w-m*).^{xxxiii} In another famous verse, when bidding farewell to his beloved with an invocation of the pagan goddess Wadd, he mentions having firmly made up his mind for the religious ritual (*dīn*) of the pilgrimage (*wa-inna d-dīna qad ‘azama*).^{xxxiv}

The poet ‘Urwa b. Ward, dated to the period about 600, proudly rejects crawling on all fours and crying like a donkey, which was suggested to him in order to protect himself against the danger of an epidemic at a visit to the Ḥaibar oasis, inhabited by Jews until the beginnings of Islam. He refers to this idea contemptuously as a delusion that is based on the Jewish religion (*wa-dālika min dīni l-yahūdi walū ‘ū*).^{xxxv} The question of age and authenticity of these lines is obviously hard to be resolved with any certainty.^{xxxvi} The clear reference to Christianity and Judaism in the usage of *dīn*, however, is certainly noteworthy; as is the fact that an adjective is used here for a positive qualification of Christianity that is closely related to a Koranic term,

which later was exclusively used for Islam and which in Islamic times would have hardly been applied to other religions any more.^{xxxvii}

Also, the usage of *dīn* in demarcation from Christianity is attested early on. Thus some Arabic historians and exegetes mention the pilgrims' call (*talbiya*) of some Arabic tribes who in pre-Islamic times took part in the pilgrimage to Mecca. They ascribe the following invocation to the Asad and Ġaṭafān, who lived in the north and east of Medina:^{xxxviii}

labbayka / ilayka ta 'dū qaliqan waḍīnuhā / mu 'tariḍan fī baṭnihā janīnuhā / muḥālifan dīna n-naṣārā dīnuhā //

“At Your service (o God)! To You she rushes (i.e. the female camel) with her saddle girth loosened / her cub in her womb struggling against (her fast running) / her religion running counter to the religion of the Christians.”

According to different traditions, this clearly anti-Christian invocation was taken up by the Prophet himself as well as by the caliph ‘Umar.^{xxxix} The call illustrates the reference to *dīn* as “religion”, which is established here and which obviously at that time already specified the existing Arabic meaning “custom, tradition, habit”. Reference to *dīn al-ḥanīfiyya* “the religion of the ḥanīfs” is also attested in a poem by Umayya b. Abī I-Ṣalt, the contemporary rival of the Prophet.^{xl} This would also link up with the Koranic verse 30:30 (see above).

However, the Koranic usage of *dīn* as an inner disposition (*fiṭra*) given to every human being in order to worship God (as in S. 30:30) still has to be accounted for. It thus becomes necessary to take another look at the Persian sources.^{xli} In the Avesta there is the term *daēnā*, which can be translated as “the sum of the spiritual characteristics of a human being, individuality, vision, inner self, conscience, religion”.^{xlii} In Middle Persian the term is *dēn*, in Manichaean writings and in New Persian *dīn*.^{xliii} Two predominant meanings are distinguished for it: 1. “religion” as divine wisdom, divine vision and divine word, the basic principle of the creation as well as the emanation of divine knowledge and divine wisdom within human beings; 2. “inner self”, intellectual ego, individuality of human beings, which comprises psychological and religious characteristics in their entirety.^{xliv} Their distinction especially comes to the fore in their attribution to different personified entities. The deity (*yazatā*) *Daēnā/Dēn*, personified religion and embodiment of wisdom, is

sometimes described as Ahura Mazdās's daughter, sometimes as his sister and wife. Together with the deities of space (*Gāh*) and time (*Zamān*) she belongs to the helpers of the creation. The second *Daēnā/Dēn* personifies man's inner self, his conscience, deeds and actions and will appear to him after death on the bridge to the world of the dead either as a beautiful young girl or an ugly old woman, depending on his deeds.

The Persian term *daēnā/dēn*, like the Koranic *dīn*, thus refers to something that God has put in human beings. At the same time the juxtaposition of the two personifications reveals on the one hand the close connection of divine and human wisdom, on the other hand, the eschatological dimension of the human conscience. What is more, the term also has a clear collective dimension in that it refers to the Mazdaistic or Manichaeic religious communities.^{xlv}

The case of Manichaeism^{xlvi} is of particular comparative interest, as the remarkable spread of this religion already led to the transfer and adaptation of its terminology to widely different languages and religious cultures. For Mani (216-276/7), its founder, the use of Middle Persian *d-y-n* (*dēn/dīn*) "religion, church, the Manichaeic community", *d-y-ndār* "religious, elect", *d-y-n-w-r*, *d-y-nāw-r*, "religious, devout, believer", *d-y-nāw-rīh* "the religious community", is already attested in his *Šābuhragān*, which he wrote in that language for the Sasanian ruler Shapur I. (240-273), and also in other Middle Persian texts attributed to him.^{xlvii} Plural constructions of *d-y-n* can also sometimes be observed in these texts.^{xlviii} Mani might perhaps be regarded as the first to establish this plural use.^{xlix} The original term which Mani himself used in his Syriac writings is, however, not attested. In the Coptic Manichean papyri which have been published since the 1930s, the equivalent for *d-y-n* is the Greek Christian term *ekklēsia* "Church", used for Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Manicheism itself, whereas Judaism and other (false) religions are regularly labelled as *dogma* and sometimes as *haireisis*.^l This distinctive usage of *ekklēsia* versus *dogma* and *haireisis* can also be found in the most famous Greek Manichean text (the *Cologne Mani Codex*).^{li} In a Latin Manichean text transmitted and quoted by Augustine, reference is once also made to the "holy church of the elect";^{lii} otherwise, *fides* and *religio* prevail in the quoted utterances of Augustine's Manichean discussion partners, which seems to follow the use of

Augustine himself.^{liii} In the early medieval Arabic descriptions of Manichaeism, which also include some paraphrases from Manichean texts, *dīn* is regularly used for the Manichean religion, church, and community.^{liv} These few examples might serve to illustrate the peculiar role of Manichaeism in the transfer of religious terminology from East to West, and, as it were, from the Middle East to the Far East, which is yet to be fully assessed.^{lv}

Otherwise, Middle Persian *dēn* “religion” is also used in connection with attributes that are strongly reminiscent of the Koranic terminology. Thus Mazdaism is called *vēh dēn* “the good religion” or *dēn-i rāst-i vēh* “the true and good religion”. In contrast, some of the early Manicheans and later also the Mazdakites (under the Sasanian King Kawād, reg. 488-496, 498-531, who strongly supported them) were referred to as *drist dēnān* “those of the right, upright religion (*drist dēn*)”.^{lvi} The striking parallels to Koranic *dīn al-ḥaqq* (e.g. 9:33) and *ad-dīn al-qayyim* and others (see above) still require explanation. As Zoroastrians, Manicheans and Mazdakites had a strong presence in southern Mesopotamia and had already expanded into the Arab Peninsula well before the rise of Islam,^{lvii} a diffusion of these terms from Persian into Arabic appears quite possible. Even before Islam there was a prominent community of Arabic-born Christians in Ḥīra in the south of Iraq who apart from Christianity were influenced by Iranian culture (so-called ‘*lbād* “*worshippers (of God)*”) and who already composed Arabic poems of religious content. They could also well have acted as transmitters of Middle Persian religious terminology into Arabic.^{lviii} The use of Persian was widely spread in Eastern Arabia, also in the ecclesiastical milieu of the Christian, mainly Nestorian, communities.^{lix}

In Syriac, too, next to the older meaning *dīnā* “verdict, judgement, trial, law, case (etc.)”, the meaning of *dāyin/dēn/dīn* “religion” is attested, which Brockelmann already traced back to Persian roots.^{lx} The oldest given reference provides a narrative about the martyrdom of Peṭyōn, a Christian missionary who was executed in 447 in the Sasanid Empire, and his followers. The text seems to have been written shortly after the events it describes. The context here, too, is the Mazdaistic religion and its rejection which a Christian convert is accused of: *aylēn ṭābātā w-aylēn iqārē eškaḥt men naṣrāyē? w-aylēn ṭābātā qabbelt menhōn da-b-dīn dīlan kfart?* “Which goods and which honours did you find among the Christians? Which goods did you

receive from them, that you abandoned our religion?”.^{lxi} The second reference comes from a shorter historical piece about the ecclesiastical history and the last Sasanid rulers since Hormzid IV. (579-590), which was probably composed in the early times of Islam.^{lxii} The story involves a Christian king who gave up the religion of the magi, i.e. Mazdaism (*šbaq le-dēn da-mgūšūtā*). As Horovitz noticed already, in the Syriac texts known so far the term is exclusively used in the context of this religion and never assigned to others.^{lxiii} However, the fact that Middle Persian *dēnīg* “religious” was borrowed by Syriac in the general meaning of “ascetic, pious”^{lxiv} shows the close relationship of these two linguistic cultures in religious matters. The borrowing of the term *dēn/dīn* “religion” in Syriac thus seems to stem from this late antique symbiosis with Middle Persian. It indicates a similar semantic borrowing for the Arabic term, which further developed to include Judaism and Christianity.

Both the semantic parallels and the aforementioned attributes of *dīn* in the Koran (*dīn al-ḥaqq*, *ad-dīn al-qayyim*) and the specific, late but still pre-Islamic borrowing of *dīn/dēn* “religion” in Syriac suggest for Arabic a similar direct or indirect borrowing from the Middle Persian religious language. This might be how *dīn* in Islam finally came out as in Persian Religion, as a wisdom of divine origins anchored within Man from the very beginnings of the world. Besides, the collective component of meaning contained in Persian *dēn* seems to have equally found its manifestation in the last stage of the use of *dīn* in the Koran. The semantic convergence of three important semantic components of *dīn* (similar attributes, origin in divine wisdom, collective character) can hardly be regarded as accidental, as suggested by Izutsu.^{lxv} This would also hold for the similarities to the introduction of the Middle Persian term into Syriac. The interpretation offered here, which comes close to that of W. Cantwell Smith,^{lxvi} suggests a synthesis of the previous opposing views, as it accounts for the Arabic linguistic material together with specific cultural processes of semantic borrowing: as in the case of *yaum ad-dīn* in relation to Syriac/Hebrew, the Middle Persian meaning of *dīn* and its complements coloured and specified the original spectrum of meaning in Arabic. The plural use, already established by the Manicheans for Middle Persian *dēn/dīn*, was, however, to emerge only at some later stage in Arabic.

5. Latin translations of *dīn*

It is now time to consider the Latin renderings of the term *dīn* in western translations of the Koran. The development of its meaning in Greek will not be considered here. Although the existence of an early Byzantine translation of the Koran is now widely accepted,^{lxvii} it is transmitted only in scattered fragments^{lxviii} (especially when it comes to the passages containing *dīn*), and, more importantly, the development of the modern western concept of religion is mostly based on the Latin tradition. It is interesting to see whether the translations of the Koranic term *dīn* into Latin mirror the development of the term “religion” in Europe, or whether they might have even influenced this development.

The oldest Latin translation of the Koran, commissioned by the Cluniac abbot Peter the Venerable, was produced in the school of translation in Toledo by the English astronomer(!) Robert of Ketton and completed in 1142/43. Whether he was really supported by a Muslim (“Muhammad”), as Peter maintains, is dubious. The translation was and is generally regarded as very imprecise, in any case very free, and thus repeatedly came under heavy criticism. It was nevertheless the only medieval translation of the Koran that found widespread acceptance, and it was printed, through Luther’s and Melanchthon’s intervention, in 1543 by Theodor Bibliander (Buchmann) in Basel.^{lxix} This text also formed the basis for translations into several European vernacular languages.^{lxx}

Ketton’s translation does not use the term *religio*. Instead, to render *dīn* into Latin, *lex* is regularly used, as Feil already observed.^{lxxi} It is unlikely to assume that the translator only knew the first, earlier variant of meaning of *dīn* (“judgement, revenge”): in those passages in which *dīn* is used in the early meaning (mostly literally or analogous to the combination *yaum ad-dīn*) the translation is correctly given as *dies iudicii*, *dies futura* or in corresponding phrases (cf. Kor. 82:9.15.17.18; 95:7; 107:1; 83:10-13 and others). In all other cases, in which *dīn* does not mean ‘judgement’ but more generally ‘religion’, it is translated as *lex*: on the one hand, the term *religio* was not suitable because, since Augustine, it exclusively referred to the *vera religio*, i.e. Christianity; on the other, *lex* was adopted as a term for Judaism (*lex*

Moysi) and – to a limited degree - also for Christianity (*lex Christi*) so that a reference to Islam as *lex Machumeti* or *lex Sarracenorum* stood to reason. A ‘classical’ passage is Kor. 109:1-3.6: *qul yā ayyuhā l-kāfirūna lā a^cbudu mā ta^cbudūna wa-lā antum ^cābidūna mā a^cbudu ... lakum dīnukum wa-liya dīnī* (“Say: O disbelievers! I worship not that which ye worship; nor worship ye that which I worship ... Unto you your religion, and unto me my religion”^{lxxii}). It becomes obvious here that Islam (‘my religion’) and the religion of the infidels are notionally identical: both are obviously *dīn*. The Latin translation strongly paraphrases and interprets: *Homines incredulos taliter alloquere: Ego quidem legem vestram atque sectam minime sequor, nec vos meam. Igitur mihi mea maneant, vobisque vestra*. (“Speak thus to the infidels: I for my part follow in no way your ‘law’ and your sect, neither do you follow mine. This is why I shall keep mine, and you will keep yours.”). In this passage, too, both religions are referred to with the same term (*lex / secta vestra* and *mea* respectively), which is, from a Christian perspective, appropriate for the religion of Christians as well as for Muḥammad’s followers. In this respect the meaning of the Koranic passage tends to be kept. Indeed there seems to be a semantic shift from *dīn* to *lex*; however, in this and many other passages it is misleading to translate the term as English “law” because the English word always carries juridical connotations, which *lex* in this context does not, or not necessarily. In contrast, the analysis of further passages will illustrate that the term *lex*, its origin in Paulinian and Augustinian theology of law notwithstanding, shares features of a general concept of religion that go beyond the narrow perspective of “law” or German “Gesetz”.

An example of this can be found in Kor. 2:256 *lā ikrāha fī d-dīni* (“there is no compulsion in religion”). However this controversial passage is understood,^{lxxiii} the collective meaning of *dīn* (‘religion’ in general) is kept in the Latin translation: *vim nequaquam propter legem inferas* (“do not use violence because of a law [i.e. because of any law]”). Since the use of violence in the name of the ‘law’ was always sanctioned (and monopolised) by the state (and the church), the meaning here can never be ‘law’ but has to be ‘religion’: the specific use of *lex* has resulted in a semantic shift away from a juridical-cum-political to a theological *terminus technicus* (*lex Moysi, lex Christi, lex Machumeti* – ultimately, then, *lex cuiuslibet prophetae*).

Another instructive passage is Kor. 5:3 *al-yauma akmaltu lakum dīnakum ... wa-raḍītu lakumu l-islāma dīnan* (“this day have I perfected your religion ... and have chosen for you as religion Islam”), which is translated with freedom by Robert of Ketton as follows: *cum hodie tibi tua lex, mihi propter te placita, donumque Dei necessarium atque sufficiens compleantur* (“because today your ‘law’, which I favour for you, and the present of God, which is necessary and sufficient, will be completed”). The Koranic passage means that God perfected the religion as an inherent part of every human being in that he manifests Islam (in later passages Islam will be referred to as *dīn al-ḥaqq*, the religion of truth). In the Latin translation Islam is freely interpreted as the final (‘necessary and sufficient’) manifestation of God; here the meaning of the term *lex* goes beyond that of ‘law’ too, as the addition of *donumque* reveals, which contains an aspect of grace.

An especially important example in this context is Kor. 9:33: *huwa lladī arsala rasūlahu bi-l-hudā wa-dīni l-ḥaqqi li-yuḏhirahu ʿalā d-dīni kullihī* (“He it is who hath sent His messenger with the guidance and the Religion of Truth, that he may cause it to prevail over all religion”). This is one of the passages in which the collective and abstract level of meaning of the Koranic concept of religion comes to the fore most clearly: Islam as a religion of truth is above all religion, which means that it is above all religions such as Judaism, Christianity and paganism. The Latin reads as follows: *suum itaque nuncium cum via recta legeque bona misit, ut ipsam manifestet, et super omnes leges extollat* (“This is why he sent his messenger with the right way and the ‘good law’ to make it manifest and exalt it beyond all [other] laws”). The uncountable singular expression *ʿalā d-dīni kullihī* (“over all/every religion”) is rendered in the plural (*super omnes leges*); the intended meaning of the phrase, i.e. the superiority of Islam over other religions, is thus transported accordingly. The translation of *dīn al-ḥaqq* (“religion of truth”) as *lex bona* may seem unusual at first glance but is probably meant to denote the ‘good, true’ law in connection with *via recta*, which guides human beings’ ways. After all it becomes obvious that translations like English ‘law’ or German ‘Gesetz’ are insufficient for *lex* because it basically denotes the ‘true religion’ that guarantees this ‘right way’.

Another crucial argument in favour of ‘religion’ as an uncountable noun can be found in Kor. 30:30: *fa-aqim waḡhaka li d-dīni ḥanīfan fiṭrata llāhi llatī faṭara n-nāsa*

‘*alaihā... dālika d-dīnu l-qayyimu* (“so set thy purpose for religion as a man by nature upright – the nature of Allah, in which He hath created man ... That is the right religion”). The complex term *fiṭra* (nature, disposition), which is taken up in the verb *faṭara*, does refer to a natural predisposition of human beings towards a religion implanted by God; if human beings direct their faces as upright believers (*ḥanīf*) to religion, i.e. if they accept Islam, then this is the right religion. The Latin reads: *Cor tuum benivole verte ad legem divinam, immutabilem, omnibus divinitus missam gentibus. Haec est enim lex recta* (“Turn you heart benignly to the divine, unchangeable ‘law’, which was sent by God to all human beings. This is, then, the right ‘law’). Apart from a misunderstanding as regards the construction of *ḥanīfan* (wrong reference of the predicative accusative to *lex*), it is, however, not inappropriate to render the phrase *fiṭrata ... n-nāsa* as a participial clause with reference to ‘law’. Thus, on the level of content, it becomes obvious that the ‘law’ sent by God to all human beings (including pagans; consider the terminus *gentes!*) is not a specific ‘law’, but religion in general (as a natural predisposition to faith, which is later called religiosity).

In conclusion one can say that the oldest Latin translation of the Koran despite all its inaccuracy at least maintains the character of *dīn* as an uncountable noun, even if its semantics are overlaid by connotations of the theology of law, which is inappropriate in the context of the Koran. Yet it becomes clear that the term *lex*, obviously influenced by *dīn*, tends to develop into a universal concept of religion. It is now important to ask whether this tendency is adopted and developed further in later Latin translations of the Koran.

At this point it is necessary to consider Marcus of Toledo’s translation, which was made shortly after Robert of Ketton’s. Although, in comparison with Ketton’s translation, it is much more literal, it has remained without influence and has until now neither been printed nor critically edited.^{lxxiv} It was probably translated without any knowledge of Ketton’s version and thus did not engage with its terminology. The few findings from this text, which do not contribute much to our question, can be summarised as follows:^{lxxv} like Robert of Ketton, Marcus of Toledo uses *lex* throughout to render *dīn* (e.g. 2:256 *non est compulsio in lege*; 109:6 *vobis est lex vestra et michi lex mea*, and similarly in all passages mentioned above). Furthermore

it is remarkable that Marcus translates the expression *al-islāma dīnan* (5:3) as *ysmahelitarum legem* (the 'law' of the Ismaelites, i.e. the Muslims), which is also typical of Ketton's translation and poses Islam as analogous to the *lex Moysi* and *lex Christi* respectively. In 9:33 *dīn al-ḥaqq* is translated rather closely as *lex veritatis*, whereas the phrase *li-yuḏhirahu ʿalā d-dīni kullihī* was clearly misunderstood, as it reads in the Latin translation *ut praeficeret eum (sic) super totam legem* ("to make him [= Muḥammad] prevail over the complete law"). The meaning of this sentence is distorted because Marcus wrongly connects the masculine personal suffix *-hu* of the verb *yuḏhira* with Muḥammad instead of *dīn* (Arab. masculine; the same mistake can also be found in the Byzantine translation of the Koran^{lxxvi}). Neither was the construction in Kor. 30:30 understood correctly; the predicative accusative *ḥanīfan* is translated adverbially as *pure* ("purely"), which remains rather incoherent: *Converte ergo faciem tuam ad legem pure. Creatura dei secundum quam creavit homines* ("Turn your face to the law, purely. The creation of God, after which he created men"). The absolute construction *fiṭrata...* is asyndetically translated in an incomplete sentence that is incomprehensible due to this shortening. In general the major difficulties faced by Marcus of Toledo in his translation arise from his attempt to be both literal and precise. In contrast to Robert of Ketton's much freer and interpretive translation it appears that the linguistic problems of Toledo's translation are too great to allow for a more thorough discussion of his handling of Koranic concepts like that of religion.

An interesting variation of the terminology can be found in the (probably fictitious) correspondence between the Muslim al-Hāšimī and the Christian al-Kindī (9th century, during the rule of the Caliph al-Ma'mūn, 813-834), which was translated into Latin in the context of the *Collectio Toletana*, too (the translator, whose identity is otherwise unknown, might have been Petrus Alfonsi).^{lxxvii} The correspondence is important for our purpose because the frequent quotations from the Koran in the letters do not follow Robert of Ketton, as one might have assumed, but seem to be the author's own direct translations from the Arabic text. As it happens, three of the aforementioned passages are cited in this exchange of letters: Kor 109:1.6 here reads ('Rescriptum Christiani' § 59,7-8): *O vos infideles ... Ego habeo fidem et vos fidem* ("O you infidels ... I have my faith and you have your faith"). The translation of

dīn as *fides* indicates that the decision in favour of *lex*, which was predominant throughout the Middle Ages, was by no means compulsory but already an interpretive move by Robert of Ketton. In Kor. 2:256, too, *dīn* is translated as *fides*, in the ‘Epistula Sarraceni’ (§ 31,17: *nichil violenter in fide*) as well as in the ‘Rescriptum Christiani’ (§ 59,1: *nulla violentia in fide*). Finally the translation of Kor. 9:33 also occurs (Epist. Sarr. § 11,6-8): ... *cum eum mitteret Deus ad nuntiandum et predicandum hominibus iustificationem (hudā) et fidei veritatem (dīn al-ḥaqq), ut ostenderet eum (sic) esse super omnem fidem (ʿala d-dīni kullihī)*. (“...because God sent him in order to proclaim and to preach the justification and the truth of the faith to show that *he* [= Muḥammad] is beyond every faith”). Here, then, the same mistake can be found as with Marcus of Toledo. Yet even with this distortion it becomes clear that *dīn* is consistently translated as *fides* and that the uncountable character of the noun is preserved.

This alternative translation of *dīn* as *fides*, which is thus attested in the 12th century parallel to *lex*, did not become dominant. In the later Middle Ages the term *lex* prevailed also in those Koranic quotations that did not go back to Ketton’s translation. These are rare but do occur, namely in the writings of Ricoldo da Monte di Croce and Juan de Segovia. The Dominican friar Ricoldo (1243-1320), a missionary in the Orient who lived in Baghdad for a long time and acquired a thorough knowledge of the Arabic language, planned to translate the Koran anew because he believed Ketton’s translation to be insufficient. Yet he never pursued his plan, and we now have to rely on the few quotations which he provides in his main anti-Islamic polemical work ‘Contra legem(!) Sarracenorum’.^{lxxviii} As the title already indicates, Ricoldo, in spite of his criticism of Robert of Ketton, clings to the traditional translation of *dīn* as *lex*, as two of the aforementioned passages illustrate: Kor. 2:256 (CLS Cap. 10,9): *in lege Dei non est compulsio* (“in the ‘law’ of God there is no compulsion”), and Kor. 109:1-6 (CLS Cap. 11,47-50): *O blasphemi, non adoro quod adoratis, nec vos adorastis quod adoro ... vobis lex vestra et michi lex mea* (“O you blasphemers, I do not worship what you worship, and you do not worship what I worship ... You have your ‘law’ and I have mine ‘law’”). Ricoldo certainly translates much more literally and precisely than Robert of Ketton, but still renders *dīn* as *lex*. It may also be interesting to note that the Greek translation of Ricoldo’s treatise by

Demetrios Kydones (ca. 1324-1397; the translation ca. 1360), as one would expect, gives *dīn/lex* as νόμος; its Latin back-translation reads *lex* and Luther finally uses 'Gesetz' in his German translation of the Latin text.^{lxxxix}

Considering Ricoldo's usage of *lex*, it may also be important to notice that he strongly relies on the so-called 'Liber denudationis' ("Book of denuding") which is a Latin translation (date unknown) of an Arabic-Christian polemical work dated between 1085 and 1132.^{lxxx} In this treatise, there are many quotations from the Koran, but unfortunately without mention of *dīn* (besides Kor. 39:31 and 3:77 which both are translated as *in die iudicii*, ch. 9.3). In the introduction (ch. 1,2), however, *lex* is used twice, once of Christianity (*blasphemantibus in legem suam*, "[the Muslims] who blaspheme against his [i.e. Christ's] religion") and once of Islam (*contrarietate elfolicha, id est perfectorum in lege Machometi*, "by the contradiction of the *elfolicha* [= *al-fuqahā*], that is of the men perfectly learned in the law/religion of Muḥammad"). In the second instance which has also led to the alternative title 'Contrarietas Alfolica [or Alpholica]', *lex* may be, however, not only a translation of *dīn*, but also an etymological hint to *al-fuqahā* ("legal scholars"). In any case, *lex* is used as a key term denoting the 'religion' of Christ and Muḥammad, respectively.

Even scarcer than Ricoldo's and the 'Liber denudationis' passages are the fragments of Juan de Segovia's (ca. 1393-1458) translation of the Koran. Finding Ketton's work not sufficient, he made a new translation, together with the Muslim jurist and Koranic scholar Isa Gidelli. This famous trilingual Koran in Arabic, Spanish and Latin, completed in 1456 and bequeathed in one single copy to the university of Salamanca, is unfortunately lost, which remains an irreplaceable loss for Islamic studies.^{lxxxi} Only in the extant prologue^{lxxxii} there are a few quotations from the Koran, but none of the passages discussed above. From the translation of 2:193 (or 8:39) *ḥattā ... yakūna d-dīnu li-llāhi* ("and religion is for Allah") as *quousque lex sit deo* and another, not identifiable Koranic passage as *lex sit una* ("there shall be one 'law' only") one can gather that *dīn* was translated as *lex* by Juan de Segovia, in spite of his otherwise innovative ways of translating. The small basis of sources, sadly, does not allow for any further conclusions, and even the recently discovered longer passage from this translation (Kor. 5:110-115) does not contain the term *dīn* or its cognates.

Cardinal Juan de Torquemada (1388-1468), Juan de Segovia's fellow countryman, contemporary and papalist opponent already at the council of Basel, wrote a refutation for Pius II. 'Contra principales errores perfidi Machometi' (1458/59), supposed to provide the Pope with arguments for calling up a new crusade at the council of rulers in Mantua.^{lxxxiii} As usual, Juan de Torquemada refers to Islam as *lex* or *secta*, and the quotations from the Koran follow Robert of Ketton. Apart from that, he also uses the term *religio* throughout, viz. in the exclusive sense of Augustine, whose work 'De vera religione' he knew and once explicitly quoted,^{lxxxiv} namely to denote exclusively the *religio Christiana*.

Another contemporary of Juan de Segovia, who exchanged letters with him, was Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). He, too, uses Robert of Ketton's translation in his Islamic main work, the 'Cribratio Alkorani' (1460/61),^{lxxxv} thus keeping consistently to the term *lex*. In one chapter, however, all of a sudden the term *religio* comes up with a view to Islam: Crib. Alk. III 8, n. 184: *Sed visus es mihi, o Mahumete, praetextu religionis dominandi potentatum quaesivisse ... Quis non intelligit finem tuae religionis, zelum et ritum tuae legis tantum ad hoc tendere, ut domineris? ... Non erat alia intentio tua quam quod deo et religione medio magnus esses.* ("But you, Muḥammad, seem to me to have aspired to power and dominion under the pretext of religion ... Who does not see that the aim of your religion and the great eagerness and ritual of your law only serves your leadership? ... Your intention was never anything else but to become powerful through God and the religion."). In this passage, almost without notice, a revolution in the conceptual history occurs: not only are Christianity and Islam referred to as *religio*, but the parallel usage of (*tua*) *religio* and (*tua*) *lex* further suggests the synonymy of the two terms. It is hardly by chance that it was Nicholas of Cusa's fictitious discussion with the Prophet Muḥammad which paved the way for an uncountable generalized use of religion in Latin, which may be called a synthesis of the Augustinian concept of the *vera religio* and the Koranic term *dīn*.

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 had caused a boom of writings on Islam; in the beginning of the confessional era, however, the question of Islam receded to the background in theology, which is mirrored in a decline of the relevant literary production. The attempts of a linguistic revision of Ketton's translation were

completely counteracted when in 1543, four hundred years after its composition, it was printed and thus came to shape the picture of Islam in the Western World for another one and a half centuries. Only in the 17th century new attempts were undertaken to translate the Koran into Latin, to which we will now finally turn.

The first of these three new translations is attributed to Kyrillos Lukaris (1572-1638), Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople. It remains fragmentary (including the Koranic text up to the beginning of surah 30 as well as fragments of surahs 94-114) and was never printed.^{lxxxvi} *Dīn* is, without any recognisable classification, translated (wrongly) as *iudicium* (Kor. 2:193; 8:39), *fides* (5:3; 109:6), and often as *religio* (3:85; 5:77; 6:70; 8:49; 10:104 and others). To give but one example, the important passage 9:33 will be cited: *Ipse est qui misit Prophetam suum cum directione (hudā) et religione vera (dīn al-ḥaqq) ut apparere faciat religione<m> omnem.* (“It is him who sent his prophet with his guidance and the true religion in order to manifest all religion.”). The final part of the quotation is incomplete and therefore distorts its meaning, but the uncountable generalized use of *dīn* is still obvious in the surviving fragment. The instructive passage 30:30 is, unfortunately, not transmitted.

A complete translation of the Koran to lay claim to a high degree of literality (*Interpretatio Alcorani litteralis*), which was also never printed and remained lost until the 19th century, was made by the learned Franciscan missionary Germanus de Silesia (1588-1670).^{lxxxvii} His translation of *dīn* also oscillates between *lex* (109:6), *fides* (2:193; 8:39; 30:30) and *religio* (2:256; 3:19; 6:161; 9:33). In some passages, several of these terms are even given side by side, showing the struggle for the correct understanding of the Koranic text, as in surah 5:3: *Hodie ostendi perfectam esse fidem vestram (dīnakum) ... et complacui vobis dando rectam normam salutiferae fidei pro lege (l-islāma dīnan).* (“Today I have shown that your faith is perfect ... and I have found my good will in giving the guideline of the salvific faith [= Islam] as the law [*dīn*] to you.”). Germanus here tries to paraphrase the term Islam with ‘guideline’ (which does not correspond to its etymology) and thus tries to provide an explanation for the traditional understanding of *dīn* as *lex*. In 30:30, in contrast, *dīn* is translated as *fides*: *Tu itaque firma faciem tuam, idest ne attendas aliam fidem quam primae institutionis Dei, ad cuius observantiam Deus creavit hominem ... Haec est illa fides recta.* (“Therefore strengthen your face, i.e. mind no other faith than the

one God originally set up, to the observance of which God created men... This is the right faith.”). The right faith (*ad-dīn al-qayyim*) is the one that God implanted into human beings (*fiṭra* is not inappropriately translated as *prima institutio*). Although the terminology still oscillates here, one can already observe a tendency towards clinging to the generalized, uncountable meaning of *dīn* prevailing in the Koran, which becomes manifest in the translations.

The climax and ending of the Latin translation of the Koran is reached with the monumental work of Ludovico Marracci (1612-1700). As the fruit of his decades of studies on Islam, Marracci, professor of Arabic at the Sapienza in Rome, published a two-volume work in 1698, with an extensive introduction ('Prodomus'), a fully vocalised Arabic edition of the Koran, a Latin translation and a detailed commentary ('Refutatio').^{lxxxviii} The translation, which even in terms of modern philological standards can still be considered as very reliable, shows an extraordinarily high level of scholarship. The same holds true for the commentary, which despite all polemics stands out for its ample use of the Arabic exegetic literature, that was taken into account here for the first time.^{lxxxix} As could be expected, Marracci renders the Koranic concept of religion *dīn* consistently as *religio* in Latin (except for passages in which the term means “judgment” or “Day of Judgement” respectively; cf. 24:2; 82:9). By way of example the aforementioned passages will be discussed: Kor. 2:256 *ne sit violentia in religione suscipienda*^{xc} (“in the acceptance of religion there shall be no compulsion”). Marracci thus interprets this passage in the sense of a prohibition of the conversion by coercion (cf. above). Kor. 5:3 *hodie perfecī vobis religionem vestram, ... et placuit mihi tradere vobis religionem Eslam* (“Today I have perfected your religion, ... and I was delighted to give unto you the religion of Islam”). Note that Marracci does not translate the term ‘Islam’ - he interprets it as the proper name of the religion instituted by Muḥammad. Kor. 9:33 *Ipse est, qui misit legatum suum cum directione (hudā) et religione vera (dīn al-ḥaqq), ut apparere faciat eam [correct!] super religionem omnem* (“It is him who sent his messengers with the guidance and the true religion in order to cause it to prevail over all religion”). The meaning of this passage is rendered perfectly. Kor 30:30 *Statue ergo faciem tuam ad religionem orthodoxus - opus dei, ad quod condidit homines. ... Haec est religio recta (ad-dīn al-qayyim)* (“So set thy purpose for religion as a man upright – the nature of God, in

which he has created man... That is the right religion”). Marracci is the first and only one to have understood and correctly transferred the construction into Latin; the predicative *ḥanīfan* is translated predicatively (*orthodoxus*) as well, the absolute *fiṭrata*... as an explicative apposition. As to the content of this passage, Marracci suggests an orientation towards the (right) religion as the result of God’s creation, i.e. as the result of natural human disposition implanted by God, which is exactly the interpretation given by Koranic exegesis.^{xci}

We have seen that the history of translating the term *dīn* is much more complex than Feil assumed. The difference between the various translations of *dīn* is above all theological, not logical, i.e. the terms *lex* and *religio* are not primarily different in their degree of abstraction (both are uncountable abstract nouns), but in their theological semantics: whereas *lex* in the Paulinian and Augustinian sense refers first to the Jewish religion, then more generally to every religion (of the book), *religio* is used by *Augustine* for the true religion only, i.e. Christianity. The Arabic-Islamic usage of *dīn* can also be exclusive for Islam as the one true religion. But the more general meaning is always kept, both in its countable and in its uncountable varieties, and the word also occurs, though much less frequently, as plural. In Latin Nicholas of Cusa carries the exclusivist concept to the extreme (in ‘De pace fidei’): Christianity is not only termed by him *vera religio* but also *una religio*, from which he then switches (in ‘Cribratio Alkorani’) to a more general concept of religion. With this Nicholas of Cusa was ahead of his times: In his engagement with Islam he can be seen as setting an example for a semantic trend which was to gain momentum later in Europe, where, from the end of the 17th century onwards, the term *religio* was systematically and consistently used for the translation of *dīn*.

ⁱ The authors wish to express their gratitude to G. Endreß (Bochum) and T. Seidensticker (Jena) for their comments on a draft of this article.

ⁱⁱ For the concept of religion see more generally J. Figl, *Handbuch der Religionswissenschaft*, Innsbruck 2003, 62-80; M. Riesebrodt, *Cultus und Heilsversprechen. Eine Theorie der Religionen*, München 2007, esp. 23-107; id., “Überlegungen zur Legitimität eines universalen Religionsbegriffs”, in: B. Luchesi, K. v. Stuckradt, *Religion im kulturellen Diskurs: Festschrift für Hans G. Kippenberg zu seinem 65. Geburtstag, Berlin 2004*, 127-149; furthermore, with a strong emphasis on Islam, W. Cantwell-Smith, *The Meaning*

and End of Religion, Minneapolis 1991 [1962]; H.-M. Haußig, *Der Religionsbegriff in den Religionen. Studien zum Selbst- und Religionsverständnis in Hinduismus, Buddhismus, Judentum und Islam*, Berlin 1999.

ⁱⁱⁱ E. Feil, *Religio*. I. *Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs vom Frühchristentum bis zur Reformation*, Göttingen 1986; II. *Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs zwischen Reformation und Rationalismus (ca. 1540-1620)*, 1997; III. *Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, 2001; IV. *Zur Begriffsgeschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, 2007.

^{iv} The term is for the first time attested in Apuleius (middle of the 2. c. AD), *De Plat. dogm.* 2,7. For a religio-philosophical discussion of the terms *religio* and *religiositas* cf. the fictitious fourth book of Cicero's 'De natura deorum', which was written in the 19th century: R. F. Gleis, *Ciceros verlorene Götterlehre. Das vierte Buch De natura deorum. Einleitung, Edition, Übersetzung mit Erläuterungen*, Trier 2008, here § 3-5 (pp. 52-58).

^v For the conceptual history apart from Feil cf. esp. the article "Religion" (various authors), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 8 (1992), 632-713.

^{vi} This might be worthwhile to be connected with the concept of *religio duplex* put forward in the European enlightenment as recently studied by Jan Assmann, *Religio duplex. Ägyptische Mysterien und europäische Aufklärung*, Berlin 2010. The parallels, however, cannot be developed further in the context of this article.

^{vii} Augustinus, *De vera religione - Die wahre Religion*. Zweisprachige Ausgabe eingeleitet, übersetzt und herausgegeben von J. Lössl (Augustinus, Opera Bd. 68), Paderborn et al. 2007, 27ff.

^{viii} In the 'Mosaicarum et Romanarum legum collatio', an anonymous synopsis of the decalogue and Roman law (4th or 5th centuries), a decree of Emperor Diocletian to Julian, Proconsul of Africa, is preserved (from Cod. Gregorianus, lib. VII) which uses the term *religio* to denote the 'religion' of the Manichaeans and the Romans as well: *...neque reprehendi a noua uetus religio deberet* (XV 3,2 in the edition of M. Hyamson, Oxford 1913); *...in relatione religionis illorum [Manichaeorum]* (XV 3,5). Besides, the Manichaean *secta* is opposed to Roman *religio(nes)* (XV 3,3). – For a possible Manichaean influence on the development of Koranic *dīn*, see below.

^{ix} Cf. D. Marafioti, "Lex (A)", *Augustinus-Lexikon*, 3 (2008), 931-943 (here: 932f.).

^x For some examples of pl. *adyān* in the Prophetic Tradition cf. Wensinck, *Concordance*, II, 168.

^{xi} Akk.: W. von Soden, *Akkadisches Handwörterbuch (AHw)*, Wiesbaden 1959-1982, I, 171; M. T. Roth, E. Reiner et al. (eds.), *The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago (CAD)*, Chicago 1961-2007, III, 150f.; Hebr.: L. Koehler/W. Baumgartner, *Hebräisches und aramäisches Lexikon zum Alten Testament*, 3. Aufl., Bd. 1, Leiden 1963, 211; W. Gesenius' *hebräisches und aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*, 18th edition., begun by R. Meyer, prepared and edited by H. Donner, 2, Berlin et al., 1995, 248f.; Syriac: J. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, Vol. I, Oxford 1879, 843; id., *A Compendious Syriac Dictionary*, Oxford 1979 [1903], 90; K. Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum*, Hildesheim 1966 [Halle 1928], 151.

^{xii} Feil (as note 2), 2 (1997), 262-268.

^{xiii} Cf. the overview in Y. Haddad, "The Conception of the Term *dīn* in the Qur'ān", *Muslim World*, 64, 1974, 114-123, here p. 114.

^{xiv} Evidence of *yaum ad-dīn*: 1:4; 15:35; 26:82; 37:20; 38:78; 51:12; 56:56; 70:26; 82:15.17.18. Often 82:9 is also counted to this group of meaning, even if *yaum* is not explicitly mentioned. Cf. also 37:53 with the respective passive participle (m.pl.) *madīnūn* "judged".

^{xv} P. C. Brodeur, "Religion", *Encyclopedia of the Qur'ān*, 4, 395-398, here 395f.

^{xvi} For the different and sometimes strongly diverging attempts at a chronologically ordering of the Koranic surahs within Islamic and Orientalist scholarly traditions of Koranic exegesis cf. the overviews in A. Welch, “Al-Ḳurʿān”, *EI*², V, 416f.; W. Montgomery Watt, *Bell’s Introduction to the Qurʿān, completely revised and enlarged*, Edinburgh 1977, 108-120; D. Krawulski, *Eine Einführung in die Koranwissenschaften*, Bern et al., 2006, 173-188.

^{xvii} Paret, *Koran*, 170, translates *dīn* here with “Religion”, which seems odd and does not correspond to Islamic tradition in the commentaries.

^{xviii} Sometimes also explained according to the first meaning, i.e. *yawma ʿidin yuwaffihimu llāhu dīnahumu l-ḥaqqā* “On that day God will pay them their just due.”

^{xix} The part of the Koranic verse 9:33 in question was cited on Umayyad silver dirhams as early as 79/698, cf. e.g. M. Broome, *A Handbook of Islamic Coins*, London 1985, 10f.

^{xx} See above, note 17.

^{xxi} Haddad, 120ff.; Brodeur, “Religion”, 396.

^{xxii} E. W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, London, Edinburgh, 1863-1893, 944; Murtaḍā az-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-ʿarūs min ḡawāhir <al-Qāmūs>*, Kuwait 1965-2002, 35, 52-56.

^{xxiii} az-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-ʿarūs*, loc. cit., based on the main work of his commentary, al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 1414), *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ*: 1. reward, revenge (*jazāʿ*), 2. Islam, 3. habit, custom (*ʿāda*), 4. divine worship (*ʿibāda*), 5. fine, ongoing or constant rain, 6. obedience (*tāʿa*), 7. humility, devotion (*ḡull*, *inqiyād*), 8. disease (*dāʿ*), 9. revenge (*ḥisāb*), 10. overcoming, defeating (*qahr*, *ḡalaba*), 11. power (*sulṭān*), 12. dominion (*mulk*), 13. decision, judgement, statute (*ḥukm*), 14. way of life (*sīra*), 15. thoughtfulness, planning (*tadbīr*), 16. confession of unity (*tauḥīd*), 17. religious community (*milla*), 18. fear of God (*waraʿ*), 19. sin (*maʿṣiya*), 20. compulsion (*ikrāh*), 21. rain (s.a.), 22. condition, situation (*ḥāl*), 23. judgement, sentence (*qaḍāʿ*). Representative references for some of these meanings from pre-Islamic poetry are discussed by T. Izutsu, *God and Man in the Quran*, Petaling Jaya, 2008 [Tokyo 1964], 243-249. For the general problems of assessing the semantic definitions given in the ancient Arabic lexica, which rarely distinguish between literal and metaphorical use and common and rare meanings, T. Seidensticker, “Lexicography: Classical Arabic”, in K. Versteegh (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, 3, Leiden 2008, 30-37, esp. 35f.

^{xxiv} Th. Nöldeke, “Untersuchungen zur semitischen Grammatik”, *ZDMG* 37, 1883, 534, n. 2.

^{xxv} K. Vollers, “Zur Erklärung von ידון Gen. 6,3”, *ZA* 14, 1899, 350ff.

^{xxvi} D. B. Macdonald, “DĪN”, *EI*¹, I, 1913, 1016f.

^{xxvii} J. Horowitz, *Koranische Untersuchungen*, Berlin, Leipzig 1926, 62. For the an-Nābīḡa und his biography see A. Arazī, “al-Nābīḡa al-Dhubyānī”, *EI*², VII, 840ff.

^{xxviii} K. Ahrens, “Christliches im Qoran. Eine Nachlese”, *ZDMG* 84, 1930, 34f.

^{xxix} W. Cantwell Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, in his chapter on Islam, 80-118.

^{xxx} L. Gardet, “DĪN”, *EI*², II, 293ff.

^{xxxi} T. Izutsu, *God and Man in the Quran*, 239-253.

^{xxxii} Cf. Hebrew *yōm had-dīn*, commonly used as a name for the New Year’s feast *Rōš ḥaš-šanāh* and *Yōm Kippūr*; Syriac *yaumā d-dīnā*, e.g. Matth. 10:15, 11:22, 11:24, 12:36. See also Gardet, “Dīn”, 293.

^{xxxiii} W. Ahlwardt, *The Divans of the ancient Arabic poets*, London 1870, p. 3, l. 24. Cf. also Ahrens, “Christliches”, 34.

^{xxxiv} W. Ahlwardt, *Divans*, 23, l. 6, also discussed by Izutsu, *God and Man*, 248f.; see also E. Wagner, *Grundzüge der klassischen arabischen Dichtung*. II. *Die arabische Dichtung in islamischer Zeit*, Darmstadt 1988, 5. It should be noted, however that W. Ahlwardt himself expresses his reservations about the authenticity of this verse in his *Bemerkungen über die Aechtheit der alten Arabischen Gedichte mit besonderer Beziehung auf die sechs Dichter, nebst Beiträgen zum richtigen Verständnis Ennābīḡa’s und Alqama’s*, Greifswald 1872, 41.

^{xxxv} T. Nöldeke, *Die Gedichte des 'Urwa ibn Alward*, Göttingen 1864, 42, l. 11; *Dīwānā 'Urwa b. al-Ward wa-s-Samau'āl*, intr. Karam al-Bustānī, Beirut 1384/1964, 46, l. 1. For the tense relationship between the heroic ethics of the Arab tribes and the *dīn* cf. I. Goldziher, "Muruwwa und Dīn", "Das arabische Stämmewesen und der Islam", in id., *Muhammedanische Studien I*, Halle 1889, 1-39, 40-100.

^{xxxvi} Cf. for a comprehensive discussion of the different positions taken on the transmission and authenticity of Old Arabic poetry E. Wagner, *Grundzüge der klassischen arabischen Dichtung*, Bd. I. *Die altarabische Dichtung*, Darmstadt 1987, 12-29.

^{xxxvii} Further evidence of Old Arabic poetry is mentioned in Horowitz, *Koranische Untersuchungen*, 62.

^{xxxviii} M. J. Kister, "Labbayka, Allāhumma, Labbayka ... On a monotheistic aspect of a Jāhiliyya practice", *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 2, 1980, 33-57; here 44, 51, n. 8, following the early Koran exegete Muqātil b. Sulaymān, d. 150H./767. For a critical overview and discussion of the *talbiya* literature and for possible criteria to assess its historical value see T. Seidensticker, "Sources for the history of pre-Islamic Religion", in A. Neuwirth/N. Sinai/M. Marx (eds.), *The Qur'ān in context: historical and literary investigations into the Qur'ānic milieu*, Leiden 2009, 293-318. The examples given above are not discussed by him but do not appear to be so close to Koranic usage as to preclude a pre-Islamic origin.

^{xxxix} M. J. Kister, loc. cit.

^{xl} T. Izutsu, *God and Man in the Quran*, 248. On Umayya b. Abī l-Ṣalt and his poetry see the recent overview by T. Seidensticker, "Die Authentizität der Umayya Ibn Abī ṣ-Ṣalt zugeschriebenen Gedichte II", *ZDMG* 161, 1, 2011, 39-68, with further literature.

^{xli} For the following see M. Shaki, "Dēn", *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, VII, 279-281; H. W. Haussig (ed.): *Wörterbuch der Mythologie*, Abt. 1, Bd. 4, *Götter und Mythen der kaukasischen und iranischen Völker*, Stuttgart 1986, Art. "Daēnā", 319f.; C. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, 2. Aufl., Berlin 1961, 662f.; H. S. Nyberg, *A Manual of Pahlavi*, Part II. *Glossary*, Wiesbaden 1974, 61f.; D. N. Mackenzie: *A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary*, London 1990 [1971], 26.

^{xlii} M. Shaki, "Dēn", 279.

^{xliii} Mackenzie, *Pahlavi Dictionary*, 26.

^{xliv} Cf. here already C. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, 662f.

^{xlv} H. S. Nyberg, *Die Religionen des Alten Iran*, Osnabrück 1966 [1938], 117f., 417; Mackenzie, *Pahlavi Dictionary*, 26.

^{xlvi} For recent overviews of the life of Mani and of Manichaeism and a representative collection of Manichean Texts in English translation see W. Sundermann, "Mani", *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, <http://www.iranica.com/articles/mani-founder-manichaeism>, publ. 20 July, 2009 (17 February 2011); W. Sundermann, "Manichaeism I. General Survey", *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, <http://persianheritage.com/articles/manicheism-1-general-survey>, publ. 20 July 2009 (17 February 2011); I. Gardner/S. N. C. Lieu, *Manichaeism Texts from the Roman Empire*, Cambridge 2004.

^{xlvii} D. N. MacKenzie, "Mani's Šābuhragān", I, *BSOAS*, 42,3, 1979, 500-534; II, *BSOAS*, 43,2, 1980, 288-310, passim; M. Boyce, *A Reader in Manichaeism Middle Persian and Parthian Texts with Notes*, Leiden 1975, passim; M. Boyce, *A Word-List of Manichaeism Middle Persian and Parthian*, Leiden 1977, 38.

^{xlviii} E.g., M. Boyce, *Reader*, Text a, 29,1: *abārīgān dēn ī pēšēnagān* „the other religions of the ancients“, 30,5: *pēšēnagān dēnān* „the previous religions“; Gardner/Lieu, *Manichaeism Texts*, 109.

^{xlix} W. Cantwell Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, 100.

^l See the references for *ekklēsia*, *dogma* and *hairesis* in the Coptic Manichean texts as listed by S. Clackson/E. Hunter/S. N. C. Lieu, *Dictionary of Manichaeism Texts, Vol. I, Texts from the Roman Empire*, Turnhout 1998, 12, 16f. (Greek), 60, 65, 67 (Coptic). The equivalence

between *d-y-n* and *ekklēsia* fully comes out in a comparison between the related Middle Persian and Coptic texts *M 5794* (and other joined fragments, Boyce, *Reader*, 29f.) and *Kephalaion* no. 151 (already in C. Schmidt/ H. J. Polotsky, *Ein Mani-Fund in Ägypten*, Berlin 1933, 40, 42, 85; published by W.-P. Funk, *Kephalaia*, fasc. 15, Berlin 1999, 370-375), see for both Gardner/Lieu, *Manichaean Texts*, 109, 265ff. Some rare uses of *dogma* for the Manichean community itself may be found in Polotsky/Ibscher, *Manichäische Homilien*, Stuttgart 1938, 83 l. 22; 84, l. 9,28.

ⁱⁱ Clackson/Hunter/Lieu, *Dictionary of Manichean Texts*, I, 12, 16f.; Gardner/Lieu, *Manichaean Texts*, 49, n.11, 65f.; from the *Cologne Mani Codex (CMC)*, ff. 11, 102, 104. Photographs of the text are available under <http://www.uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/ifa/NRWakademie/papyrologie/Manikodex/bildermani.html> (24 March 2011).

ⁱⁱⁱ *Epistula fundamenti*, transmitted in fragments by Augustine, fragment no. 11, Gardner/Lieu, *Manichaean Texts*, 171; Clackson/Hunter/Lieu, *Dictionary of Manichean Texts*, I, 188, 200.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ See especially Augustine, *Contra Faustum*; for *religio*: 13, 1; 16, 1, 6, 8; 20, 1, 2, 3; 22, 1, 2; *fides* also in the Tebessa Codex, see Clackson/Hunter/Lieu, *Dictionary of Manichean Texts*, I, 188. For Faustus' use and critique of *fides* see A. Hoffmann, "Erst einsehen, dann glauben. Die nordafrikanischen Manichäer zwischen Erkenntnisanspruch, Glaubensforderung und Glaubenskritik", in J. van Oort/O. Wermelinger/G. Wurst (eds.), *Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West*, Leiden et al., 2001, 67-112; esp. 85-91.

^{liv} F. de Blois/E. C. D. Hunter/D. Taillieu, *Dictionary of Manichaean Texts*, Vol. II. *Text from Iraq and Iran*, Turnhout, 2006, 46.

^{lv} For Mani and his significance for the general conceptualization of religion already W. Cantwell Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, 92-100.

^{lvi} H. S. Nyberg, *A Manual of Pahlavi*, II, 61f.; G. Widengren, *Die Religionen Irans*, Stuttgart 1965, 84f., 251f., 308; M. Guidi/M. Morony, "Mazdak", *EF²*, VI, 949ff.

^{lvii} M. G. Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, Piscataway, N.J., 2005 [1984], 222f., 234f., 376f.; M. Guidi/M. Morony, "Mazdak", *EF²*, VI, 951; for the question of the Manichaeans in Arabia and their possible identification with the *Ṣābi'*a of the Koran cf. F. C. de Blois, "Zindīk", *EI*, new ed., XI, 511.

^{lviii} A recent portrayal in I. Toral-Niehoff, "The 'Ibād of al-Hīra: an Arab Christian Community in Late Antique Iraq", in A. Neuwirth/N. Sinai/M. Marx (eds.), *The Qur'ān in Context*, 323-347. For a quite different, "revisionist" interpretation of the Iranian influence on early Islam, cf. V. Popp, "Von Ugarit nach Sāmarrā. Eine archäologische Reise auf den Spuren Ernst Herzfelds", in K.-H. Ohlig (ed.), *Der frühe Islam. Eine historisch-kritische Rekonstruktion anhand zeitgenössischer Quellen*, Berlin 2007, 178-182.

^{lix} For Eastern Arabia and its Christian, mainly Nestorian, communities, D. T. Potts, *The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity, Vol. II. From Alexander the Great to the Coming of Islam*, Oxford 1990, 241-245. For a general overview of the archaeological traces of Christianity in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, see B. Finster, "Arabia in Late Antiquity: An Outline of the cultural situation in the Peninsula at the time of Muhammad", in A. Neuwirth/N. Sinai/M. Marx (eds.), *The Qur'ān in context*, 61-114.

^{lx} K. Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum*, Hildesheim 1928 [1928], 151; M. Sokoloff, *A Syriac Lexicon. A Translation from the Latin, Correction, Expansion, and Update of C. Brockelmann's Lexicon Syriacum*, Wionna Lake et al., 2009, 268; J. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, Oxford 1879, I, 843.

^{lxi} P. Bedjan (ed.), *Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum Syriace (AMS)*, Hildesheim 1968 [Paris, Leipzig 1891], II, 576, l. 4ff.

^{lxii} I. Guidi (ed.), *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium (CSCO) 1. Scriptores Syri, 1. Chronica Minora (CM)*, I, Louvain 1960, 23 z. 12; Th. Nöldeke, "Die von Guidi

herausgegebene syrische Chronik”, *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse*, CXXVIII, IX., Wien 1893, 21. For the CM see also A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, Bonn 1922, 5.

^{lxiii} J. Horowitz, *Koranische Untersuchungen*, 62.

^{lxiv} J. Payne Smith, *Compendious Syriac Dictionary*, 91; id., *Supplement to the Thesaurus Syriacus*, Hildesheim [Oxford 1927], 89.

^{lxv} T. Izutsu, *God and Man in the Quran*, 246.

^{lxvi} Cantwell Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, 101.

^{lxvii} Cf. E. Trapp, “Gab es eine byzantinische Koranübersetzung?”, *Diptycha* 2 (1980/81), 7-17.

^{lxviii} Edited by K. Förstel: *Schriften zum Islam von Arethas und Euthymios Zigabenos und Fragmente der griechischen Koranübersetzung*. Griechisch-deutsche Textausgabe von K.F., Wiesbaden 2009 (Corpus Islamo- Christianum, Ser. Graec. 7).

^{lxix} *Machumetis Sarracenorum principis, eiusque successorum vitae, ac doctrina, ipseque Alcoran ... opera et studio Theodori Bibliandri*, n.l., n.d. (Basel 1543, ²Zürich 1550, quotations follow the second edition). For the origin and historical context of this print edition of the Koran see comprehensively H. Bobzin, *Der Koran im Zeitalter der Reformation. Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Arabistik und Islamkunde in Europa*, Beirut 1995.

^{lxx} Cf. the overview in H. Bobzin, “Translations of the Qur’ān”, *Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān*, 5 (2006), 340-358.

^{lxxi} Cf. note 2 above.

^{lxxii} The English translations from the Koran here and elsewhere are taken from M. Pickthall, *The Glorious Koran*, London ⁶1976.

^{lxxiii} Cf. the overview of different interpretations in Y. Friedmann, “Tolerance and Coercion”, in *Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān*, 5 (2006), 290-294.

^{lxxiv} For the characteristics of this translation see recently N. Petrus i Pons, “Marcos de Toledo y la segunda traducción latina del Corán”, in: M. Barceló / J. Martínez Gázquez (eds.), *Musulmanes y cristianos en Hispania durante las conquistas de los siglos xii y xiii*, Bellaterra 2005, 87-94.

^{lxxv} I owe the examples of the translation from the manuscripts (Torino, BN Codex F.V. 35; Paris, BNF lat. 14503; Wien, ÖNB, 4297) to Dr. Ulisse Cecini (Erlangen, now Bochum); many thanks to him for his help.

^{lxxvi} Fragment 45 Förstel. Cf. forthcoming R. F. Glej, “Der Mistkäfer und andere Missverständnisse. Zur byzantinischen Koranübersetzung”, in: id. (ed.), *Early Translations of the Qur’ān. Overview and Case Studies*.

^{lxxvii} *Exposición y refutación del Islam. La versión latina de las epístolas de al-Hāšimī y al-Kindī*. Edición, traducción y estudio de Fernando González Muñoz, A Coruña 2005.

^{lxxviii} J.-M. Mérioux, “L’ouvrage d’un frère prêcheur Florentin en Orient à la fin du XIIIe siècle. Le ‘Contra legem Sarracenorum’ de Riccoldo da Monte di Croce”, *Memorie Domenicane* 17 (1986), 1-144.

^{lxxix} Cf. Bobzin (as note 59), 140f.

^{lxxx} Cf. Th. E. Burman, *Religious Polemic and the Intellectual History of the Mozarabs, c. 1050-1200*. Leiden 1994 (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, 52). Burman presents an exhaustive study of that treatise, along with an edition and an English translation.

^{lxxxi} Cf. U. Roth / R. F. Glej, “Die Spuren der lateinischen Koranübersetzung des Juan de Segovia - alte Probleme und ein neuer Fund“, *Neulateinisches Jahrbuch* 11 (2009), 109-154.

^{lxxxii} J. Martínez Gázquez, “El Prólogo de Juan de Segovia al Corán (*Qur’an*) trilingüe (1456)“, *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch* 38:2 (2003), 389-410.

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- ^{lxxxiii} Juan de Torquemada, *Tractatus contra principales errores perfidi Machometi (1458/59). Edition, deutsche Übersetzung mit Erläuterungen* von R. F. Glej und C. Finiello, Wiesbaden (in preparation, expected to be published in 2012) (Corpus Islamo-Christianum, Ser. Lat. 7).
- ^{lxxxiv} Juan de Torquemada, *Tractatus* Cap. 10, 113ff.
- ^{lxxxv} Nikolaus von Kues, *Sichtung des Korans*. Auf der Grundlage des Textes der kritischen Ausgabe neu übersetzt und mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von L. Hagemann und R. Glej. Lateinisch-deutsch, 3 Bde., Hamburg 1989-1993.
- ^{lxxxvi} Ó. de la Cruz Palma, *La traducción latina del Corán atribuida al Patriarca de Constantinopla Cirilo Lúcaris (1572-1638)*, Madrid 2006.
- ^{lxxxvii} M. Devič, “Une traduction inédite du Coran”, *Journal Asiatique* 8:1 (1883), 342-406. A critical edition is now available by A. García Masegosa, *Germán de Silesia, Interpretatio Alcorani litteralis. Parte I: La traducción latina; introducción y edición crítica*, Madrid 2009.
- ^{lxxxviii} *Alcorani textus universus ex correctioribus Arabum exemplaribus summa fide, atque pulcherrimis characteribus descriptus, eademque fide, ac pari diligentia ex Arabico idiomate in Latinum translatus ... Auctore Ludovico Marraccio, Pataviae 1698.*
- ^{lxxxix} Cf. R. F. Glej, “Arabismus latine personatus. Die Koranübersetzung von Ludovico Marracci (1698) und die Funktion des Lateinischen”, *Jahrbuch für Europäische Wissenschaftskultur* 5 (2009/2010), 93-115.
- ^{xc} Words added by Marracci were set in a different layout in his books; here they appear as non-Italicized words since the overall text is set in Italics.
- ^{xci} See, e.g., D. B. Macdonald, “Fiṭra”, *Et*, II, 931f.